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Abstract
Errors in hardware and software lead to vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers.
Proposed exploit mitigation techniques can be broadly categorized into two: software-only
techniques and techniques that propose specialized hardware extensions. Software-only
techniques can be implemented on existing hardware, but typically suffer from impractically
high overheads. On the other hand, specialized hardware extensions, while improving
performance, in practice require a long time to be incorporated into production hardware.
In this dissertation, we propose adapting existing processor features to provide novel and
low-overhead security solutions.
In the first part of the dissertation, we show how modern hardware features can be used
to provide efficient memory safety. One component of memory safety that has become
important in recent years is temporal memory safety. Temporal memory safety techniques
are used to detect memory errors such as use-after-free errors. This dissertation proposes a
temporal memory safety technique that takes advantage of pointer authentication hardware
to significantly reduce the memory and runtime overhead of traditional temporal safety
techniques. Providing complete memory safety on resource constrained devices is expensive,
therefore we propose software-based fault isolation (sandboxing) as an efficient alternative
to constrain attackers’ access to code and data in embedded systems. We show how we can
use the memory protection unit (MPU) hardware available in many embedded devices along
with a small trusted runtime to build a low-overhead sandboxing mechanism.
In the second part of the dissertation, we show how hardware performance counters
in modern processors can be used to detect rowhammer attacks. Our technique detects
rowhammer attacks by monitoring for high locality memory accesses out of the last-level
cache using hardware performance counters. The technique accurately detects rowhammer
attacks with a low performance overhead and without requiring hardware modifications.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years it has become common to hear news stories such as ransomware attacks
forcing hospitals to shutdown [1], power plants being at risk due to software flaws [2] and
companies rolling out patches to stop major security bugs [3, 4]. Such stories typically begin
with software bugs such as memory corruption bugs. These bugs create vulnerabilities that
can be exploited by attackers to, for example, leak memory, escalate privilege or execute
arbitrary code. One of the most exploited software vulnerabilities are memory corruption
vulnerabilities.
1.1 Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities
Many programs including OS kernels and runtime environments are written in unmanaged
languages such as C and C++. While programs written with these languages can achieve
high performance, the fact that memory is managed by the programmer makes them prone
to memory corruption errors such as buffer overflow and use-after-free errors. These errors
have historically been one of the most exploited errors and still persist today. Figure 1.1
shows a study of the root causes of critical vulnerabilities for a five year period. The data
is compiled from [5]. From the graph we can see that memory corruption errors (buffer
overflow and use-after-free errors) are still the number one causes of critical vulnerabilities.
In 2017 alone, they made up more than 50% of the vulnerabilities.
Memory corruption errors are typically used as a basis for exploits such as control-flow
hijacking or data-oriented programming [6, 7]. Figure 1.2 shows how memory corruption
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Figure 1.1 Root Causes of Critical Vulnerabilities for the Past Five Years.
errors are used to mount an attack, taking control-flow hijacking attack as an example [8].
The first step of a control-flow hijacking attack is making a pointer go out-of bounds using a
buffer overflow vulnerability or accessing a dangling pointer by using a use-after-free error.
Assuming now the pointer points to a code pointer, we can use it to modify the value of the
code pointer so that the code pointer points to exploit code. Then using an indirect call, an
indirect branch or a return instruction, control is transferred to the exploit code. The exploit
code can be new code injected by the attacker or chained together using already existing
code (code gadgets). The exploit code typically starts a command shell to allow the attacker
to gain control of the system (i.e. to execute arbitrary code and access arbitrary data).
1.2 Memory Corruption Exploit Mitigations
Various defenses against memory corruption exploits have been proposed. These techniques
target the various stages of the exploit as shown on Figure 1.2. A group of techniques, called
memory safety techniques, target the root causes of the exploits - the memory corruption
2
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Figure 1.2 Control-flow Hijacking Attack and Mitigations. The figure shows the stages of
mounting a control-flow hijacking attack and the different mitigation techniques that have been
proposed. The mitigations target the different stages of the attack.
errors themselves. These techniques are categorized as spatial safety or temporal safety
techniques. Spatial safety techniques detect spatial errors such as buffer overflows [8].
This typically involves transforming code to include bounds checking instructions. Tem-
poral safety techniques detect temporal errors such as use-after-free errors using various
approaches [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
Enforcing complete memory safety would stop all memory-corruption-based attacks;
however, its performance overhead would be very high. For this reason, other techniques that
target the later stages of the control-flow hijacking attack have been proposed. Assuming
there is a potential memory corruption error, one thing that can be done is prevent the corrup-
tion of code pointers at the second stage on Figure 1.2. That is what Code Pointer Integrity
(CPI) does [15]. Other techniques attempt to hide the addresses of payload code or gadgets
by randomizing the locations of code and data. Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR) [16] is an example of such a technique.
Assuming the attacker knows the location of the payload code or gadgets, and they
can corrupt a code pointer, the next step is to jump to that code. This entails diverting the
execution from the control-flow defined by the source code. Control-flow Integrity (CFI)
solutions that enforce some policy regarding indirect control transfers can detect control-
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flow hijacking attacks at this stage. If the attack makes it past this stage, the control-flow
hijacking attack is considered a success and the attacker is assumed to have some control
of the system. At this stage, higher-level defences such as Software-based fault Isolation
(sandboxing) can be used to confine the attacker’s access to code and data (i.e., the attacker
is only allowed to access code and data defined by an access control policy).
Typically, mitigations are implemented using software-only techniques. While software-
only techniques can be implemented on existing hardware, they suffer from high performance
overheads. For example, complete memory safety (i.e., a technique that provides both spatial
and temporal memory safety) has an average slow down of more than 2x [17]. To reduce the
overhead of software-only techniques, specialized hardware extensions have been proposed
( e.g. [18, 19, 20] ). Hardware extensions can significantly reduce the overhead, however
the techniques can not be used on existing hardware. In addition to this, in practice it takes
a long time for a hardware extension to be incorporated into production hardware. For
example, control-flow integrity (CFI) [21] is one of the most popular control flow security
techniques. Even though hardware support for CFI has been proposed as early as 2005, it is
only recently that Intel announced its plan to include hardware support for CFI in future
processors [22].
A middle ground in addressing the issue of high overhead in software-only techniques
and usability in specialized hardware extensions is adapting existing processor features.
Modern processors are rich with hardware features. For example, the x86 architecture
has introduced more than 20 ISA extensions since 2011 [23]. We can use these features
along with software techniques to design more practical security solutions without requiring
specialized hardware extensions.
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1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
In this dissertation, we take the approach of adapting existing processor features to pro-
vide novel and practical security solutions. We present three works that demonstrate this
approach. In Chapter 2, we present an efficient temporal memory safety technique that uses
the pointer authentication feature in ARM processors. In Chapter 3, we present a technique
that uses memory protection unit hardware to provide an efficient sandboxing capability in
an embedded device. Finally, in Chapter 4, we show how we can detect rowhammer attacks
using hardware performance counters.
1.3.1 Efficient Temporal Memory Safety with Pointer Authentication
As mentioned in the previous section, temporal safety is the first line of defense against
use-after-free errors. Use-after-free errors occur when an object is accessed outside of the
time during which it was allocated (after the object has been freed). As shown on Figure 1.1,
they are among the top four critical vulnerabilities and have been consistently on the rise.
For example, from the year 2015 to 2017, the number of critical use-after-free errors has
increased by 8x. In the 2017 Pwn2Own hacking contest, more than half of the exploits used
a use-after-free vulnerability [24].
The Lock-and-key Temporal Safety Technique: A number of temporal safety tech-
niques have been proposed over the years [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. These techniques vary
from those that provide probabilistic protections to those that guarantee temporal safety with
varying degree of compatibility, complexity and performance overhead. One such technique
is the lock-and-key technique [9, 14, 25]. This technique assigns a key for each pointer to a
memory object, and a matching lock value to the object. On every access to the memory
object, a check is made to see if the lock and key values match. Access to the memory object
is allowed only if a pointer key matches that of the object lock. When a memory object is
deallocated, the lock value is changed, so that further accesses using dangling pointers will
5
be detected.
An important parameter that affects the performance of a lock-and-key technique is
metadata management (i.e, how lock and key metadata is stored and accessed). Two aspects
of metadata management are important:
(1) Granularity of metadata (i.e., pointer metadata vs. memory object metadata):
Previous lock-and-key defenses keep a key and lock pointer metadata for each pointer.
Typically, there are more pointers than memory objects in a program, therefore keeping
per-pointer metadata incurs higher memory overhead than keeping per-memory-object
metadata.
(2) How metadata is stored: Some techniques replace pointers with fat pointers [14, 25]
to store metadata. Fat pointers are structures that contain pointer metadata in addition to the
original pointer value. Fat pointers do not add much additional cache pressure compared to
regular pointers, however, they require extensive instrumentation of a program [26]. Other
techniques have proposed using disjoint metadata storage [9, 18]. One such approach is
using a direct-mapped shadow, where metadata is stored at a fixed offset from a pointer.
However, shadowing every pointer with this approach incurs a high memory overhead.
To reduce the memory footprint, CETS [9] uses a two-level trie data structure to store
per-pointer metadata. While this approach has better compatibility than the fat-pointer-based
approaches, the multiple loads required to access metadata incur a high runtime overhead.
Furthermore, the need to explicitly propagate metadata when a new pointer is derived from
an existing pointer makes code instrumentation complex. For example, function prototypes
need to be replaced with new prototypes that include metadata.
The lock-and-key technique is effective in detecting use-after-free errors, however previ-
ous proposals suffer from complex program instrumentation and high memory and runtime
overheads that arise from the way metadata is stored and accessed. In Chapter 2 of this
thesis, we propose PETS, a lock-and-key temporal safety technique that takes advantage
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of the recently introduced pointer authentication feature in the ARM architecture [27] to
provide efficient temporal safety.
Pointer authentication stores a cryptographic hash of the pointer value, called a pointer
authentication code (PAC), in the unused bits of pointers. With PETS, PACs are used as
a replacement for keys. This way lock metadata is kept per memory object instead of per
pointer, reducing the metadata storage overhead. Furthermore, the relatively small metadata
means we can use a direct-mapped shadow to store lock pointer metadata resulting in faster
metadata access. Finally, because the key metadata is embedded in the pointer itself, passing
pointers as function arguments doesn’t require changes to the standard calling convention.
1.3.2 Efficient Software-based Fault Isolation for Embedded Devices
Embedded devices are exposed to the same memory corruption vulnerabilities that are
common in traditional computing systems [28, 29, 30]. To make matters worse, many
embedded systems lack fundamental code and data memory protection mechanisms that are
available in more powerful computing systems. For example, low-end embedded processors
typically do not include a memory management unit (MMU) to reduce cost and in some
cases to provide real-time execution time guarantees [31]. Therefore, low-end embedded
systems typically operate in a single address space with tightly-coupled software modules
(e.g., RTOS kernels, peripheral drivers, libraries, etc.) without any form of isolation between
modules. A bug in one software module can compromise the security of the whole system.
Previous works have proposed mechanisms to protect code and data in embedded sys-
tems, with varying degrees of security assurances and resource requirements. TrustLite [32]
proposed a hardware extension to provide isolation of trusted modules (Trustlets) from
untrusted code including an untrusted OS. While TrustLite provides strong data isolation
guarantees, it requires a hardware extension. Most importantly, it is hardly scalable as
the required area of the hardware extension grows linearly with the number of protected
modules (the area of the hardware extension matches that of the core for nine modules).
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Other works have proposed variants of software-based fault isolation (SFI) as a mech-
anism to isolate tightly-coupled software modules that share the same address space.
ARMor [33] uses SFI to sandbox non-critical code by performing binary rewriting to
put checks before store operations identified as being potentially unsafe. At runtime, it uses
a separate control stack to protect return addresses. Similarly, [34] and [35] use a separate
stack to protect return addresses. Other indirect control flow instructions are validated by
runtime checks. These software-based protection mechanisms are attractive as they don’t
require hardware changes. However, this reduced hardware requirement comes at the cost
of reduced performance and/or security. In order to reduce the overhead of the runtime
checks, the techniques only provide write protection. A malicious software can read and
leak sensitive data. In addition to this, the additional memory guard instructions result in
larger code sizes and higher performance overheads. As such, there is a need for a low-cost
mechanism that provides strong (read, write, and execution) protection.
In Chapter 3, we present uSFI, a low-cost code and data isolation mechanism for resource
constrained embedded devices. uSFI uses readily available hardware, memory protection
unit (MPU), along with static software analysis to provide stronger security guarantees
at a lower cost than previous efforts. MPU allows partitioning memory into regions and
assigning attributes and access permissions to each region. The MPU hardware enforces the
access permissions, therefore there is no need to instrument every memory access instruction,
eliminating the performance overhead associated with memory access checks. Further, uSFI
provides both read and write protection, guaranteeing stronger security than previous works.
1.3.3 Detecting Rowhammer Attacks with Hardware Performance
Counters
Rowhammer attacks exploit an electrical cross-talk property within the dense interconnect of
modern DRAMs (also known as DRAM disturbance errors). Kim, et al. [36] showed that by
repeatedly accessing a DRAM row referred to as an aggressor row, bits in adjacent DRAM
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rows (called victim rows) can be flipped. To flip bits, the aggressor row has to be accessed
100’s of thousands of times within a DRAM refresh period (typically 64ms). In order to
bypass the cache and quickly access the aggressor row, the authors used x86’s CLFLUSH
instruction. Subsequently, Seaborn and Dullien [37] demonstrated two attacks that use
rowhammering. The first attack used rowhammering to escape from the Native Client
sandbox by rowhammering a code segment and rewriting an already verified instruction. In
their second attack, they were able to gain read/write access to page table entries, essentially
gaining access to all physical memory. These attacks showed that DRAM disturbance errors
not only cause unexpected program behaviors or failures, but also present major security
risks.
A number of mitigation techniques for the rowhammer problem have been suggested for
both legacy and future systems. One technique that is currently in use is doubling DRAM
refresh rate (i.e. reducing the refresh period from 64ms to 32ms) [38, 39, 40]. By doing this
it is believed that there will not be sufficient time to generate enough DRAM row activations.
But as has been suggested previously [36] and as we will show in Chapter 4, 32ms is more
than sufficient to generate enough DRAM row activations to produce bit flips. A second
protection mechanism used against rowhammering-based attacks is limiting access to cache
flushing instruction CLFLUSH [37]. CLFLUSH allows quick access to DRAM by flushing
a specific cache line, and restricting this instruction makes rowhammering non-trivial. But
as we show in Chapter 4 and as shown by subsequent works [41, 42], rowhammering attack
can be implemented with ordinary load and store instructions without requiring a cache
flushing instruction.
There is a mention of the existence of protections against rowhammer errors on more
recent devices [43, 44]. The LPDDR4 specification and new DDR4 modules include a tar-
geted row refresh (TRR) capability designed to thwart rowhammer attacks. The mechanism
tracks the number of row activations within a fixed time window, and selectively refreshes
rows adjacent to a too-frequently accessed DRAM row. However, recent works have shown
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that DDR4 is also susceptible to rowhammer attacks [41, 45].
Finally, the architecture literature has seen a few rowhammer protection propos-
als [36, 46]. For example, one proposal utilizes probabilistic adjacent row activation (PARA)
to refresh the neighboring rows of any DRAM row access, with low probability [36]. The
idea behind this approach is that the many repeated DRAM row accesses required to hammer
a victim DRAM row will result in an early refresh of the victim row with extremely high
(cumulative) probability [36]. However, such solutions require the introduction of new
hardware, therefore wouldn’t protect existing systems.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we show how we can detect rowhammer attacks on exist-
ing systems. We make the observation that rowhammer attacks require high-locality misses
out of the last-level cache. Therefore, it is possible to detect rowhammer attacks by monitor-
ing for locality of DRAM memory accesses. To determine the locality of DRAM memory
accesses, we use address sampling features provided by modern hardware performance
counters.
In summary, the dissertation makes the following contributions:
Using pointer authentication for efficient temporal safety: In Chapter 2, we make the
following contributions towards providing efficient temporal safety:
• We propose using pointer authentication for temporal safety. The proposed technique
we call PETS adapts the lock-and-key mechanism, but instead of keeping per-pointer
key metadata, it uses pointer authentication codes (PACs) embedded in the unused bits
of pointers. We show that this allows using direct-mapped shadow to store metadata
which improves performance compared to other lock-and-key techniques.
• We show how we can further improve the performance of PETS by using a low-fat
memory allocator. In this scheme, the lock pointer is encoded in the pointer value
itself, avoiding the need to store lock pointer metadata altogether.
• We evaluate PETS using SPECCPU2006 benchmarks and show that it has low runtime
overhead compared to previous work (average overhead of 57% for low-fat PETS).
In terms of memory overhead, we show that PETS has the least memory overhead
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compared to other temporal safety techniques.
Using memory protection unit for efficient and strong sandboxing: In Chapter 3, we
make the following contributions towards providing efficient sandboxing for embedded
systems:
• We present uSFI, a code and data protection mechanism for low-resource devices.
uSFI uses software analysis and widely available hardware support in embedded
processors (memory protection units) to provide low-cost code and data isolation
as well as I/O access control. Through the use of a specialized runtime and verifier,
uSFI maintains these protections without instrumenting memory access instructions or
indirect jumps, thus providing low-cost software module isolation even in the presence
of buggy or malicious privileged code (e.g., a compromised kernel).
• We implement uSFI for the widely used ARMv7-M architecture. Using the MiBench
embedded benchmarks suite and other real-world applications, we show that uSFI
has low code size and performance overheads. Moreover, we show that the fraction
of code that must be trusted in the system (i.e., the uSFI runtime) is a trivially small
fraction of the overall system code size. At 150 lines of code, the attack surface of our
trust management system can be easily analyzed and inspected to gain trust.
Using hardware performance counters to detect rowhammer attacks: In the last part
of this thesis, we show that current rowhammer mitigation techniques for existing systems
(i.e., disallowing cache flush instructions and doubling refresh rates) do not work. To that
end, we proposed a software-based rowhammer detector that uses existing performance
counter features. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We demonstrate the first CLFLUSH-free rowhammer attack, thereby thwarting efforts
to deter rowhammering by restricting access to the CLFLUSH instruction.
• We present ANVIL, a software-based rowhammer detector which protects existing
and future commodity DRAMs. We implement ANVIL using existing hardware
performance monitoring infrastructure. ANVIL works by monitoring the locality of
DRAM row accesses out of the last-level cache.
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• We implement ANVIL as a Linux kernel module that utilizes Intel architecture perfor-
mance monitoring capabilities to detect memory access locality. The detector uses a
multi-staged approach to reduce detector overheads, leading to an average slowdown
(for non-malicious programs) of about 1%, and worst-case slowdown of 3.2% for
SPEC2006 integer benchmarks. The detector is accurate, with no false negatives and
less than 1% false positives.
Dissertation Organization: The remainder of the dissertations is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, an efficient temporal safety technique is discussed. Chapter 3 proposes an
efficient sandboxing mechanism for IoT-class devices. Chapter 4 details how hardware
performance counters can be used to detect rowhammer attacks. Finally, we conclude in
Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Pointer Authentication for Efficient
Temporal Memory Safety
2.1 Introduction
Temporal memory safety is one of the first line of defenses against memory corruption
exploits. It is used to detect temporal errors such as use-after-free errors. Use-after-free
errors occur when an object is accessed outside of the time during which it was allocated.
The code example below shows a use-after-free vulnerability that can be used to mount a
control-flow hijacking attack. The example is adapted from [10].
1 vo id (∗∗ p t r ) ( ) = m a l loc ( s i z e o f ( vo id ∗ ) ) ; / / A l l o c a t e s p a c e
2 ∗ p t r = &func1 ;
3 . . .
4 vo id (∗∗ n e w p t r ) ( ) ;
5 n e w p t r = p t r ; / / Copy p o i n t e r
6 . . .
7 f r e e ( p t r ) ; / / F r ee s p a c e
8 u s e r i n p u t = m a l loc ( . . . ) ; / / R e a l l o c a t e s p a c e
9 ∗ u s e r i n p u t = . . . / / O v e r w r i t e w i th i n p u t
10 (∗ n e w p t r ) ( ) ; / / Use−a f t e r −f r e e
Listing 2.1 Use-after-free Vulnerability Example
In the example ptr is a function pointer and points to the function func1. A copy of this
pointer is made and is assigned to new ptr on line 5. When the memory object is freed on
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line 5, new ptr becomes dangling. On line 8, the same memory object is reallocated and
populated with a user-defined input value. The function call on line 10 creates a control-flow
vulnerability because the address can be overwritten to an arbitrary value such as an ROP
gadget.
Temporal memory safety techniques are used to detect such vulnerabilities. In this
chapter, we show how modern processor features can be used to design an efficient temporal
memory safety technique.
2.2 Background
In this section we introduce the concepts that are relevant throughout the chapter. We start
by describing the lock-and-key technique - a popular temporal memory safety technique we
build up on, and then we discuss two features that we use to improve the performance of the
traditional lock-and-key technique.
2.2.1 The Lock-and-key Technique
A number of techniques known as temporal safety techniques have been proposed to protect
against use-after-free vulnerabilities. The related work section discusses in detail the differ-
ent kinds of temporal safety techniques. Here we will only describe one commonly used
technique, the lock-and-key technique [9], which this work builds up on.Figure 2.1(a,b,c)
demonstrates the lock-and-key technique. With this technique, each memory allocation
(memory object) is assigned a lock, and each valid pointer to that allocation is assigned a
matching key. On each access to the object, a check is made to make sure that the lock and
key values match. When the memory is deallocated, the lock value is incremented by one so
that checks will fail on subsequent references using dangling pointers.
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Figure 2.1 The Lock-and-Key Technique. The figure compares the traditional lock-and-key
technique with our proposed pointer-authentication-based technique (PETS). When a memory object
is allocated, it is assigned a lock. In the traditional technique, a matching key as well as a pointer to
the lock is kept as metadata for each pointer. In our technique, pointer authentication code (PAC)
values in the extra bits of pointers are used as a substitute to keys. In addition to this, only one lock
address metadata is kept per the minimum allocatable object size. When a new pointer is derived
from an old pointer, a PAC value is computed for the new pointer using the PACDA instruction.
On each memory dereference, the PAC value of a pointer is verified using the AUTDA instruction.
Finally, when the memory object is freed, the value of the lock is incremented by one.
2.2.2 ARM Pointer Authentication
In this work, we use pointer authentication to provide efficient temporal safety. Pointer
authentication is a security primitive introduced in ARMv8.3-A and is used to verify the
integrity of pointers [27]. It uses the unused bits in a pointer to store a cryptographic hash
of the pointer value called Pointer Authentication Code (PAC). The size of the PAC can
vary from 11 to 31 bits depending on the system configuration. For example on AArch64,
the Linux kernel uses a 39-bit virtual address space by default which allows for a 24-bit
PAC [27].
The PAC is computed as a truncated output of the QARMA block cipher [47] or an
implementation defined algorithm [48]. In this work we assume QARMA is used. As shown
in Figure 2.2, three inputs are used to compute the PAC: the pointer value, a 128-bit secret
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Figure 2.2 ARM Pointer Authentication – Computing the PAC. The PAC is computed as a
truncated output of the QARMA block cipher.
key and a 64-bit context value. The key is stored in internal registers and is not accessible by
user mode. The context value can be any user supplied value. In this work we use a memory
object lock value as the context value. The Pointer Authentication specification defines five
keys. Two keys (key A and key B) are used to compute PACs for data pointers and other
two key are used for instruction pointers. A fifth key is provided for a generic authentication
instruction.
The pointer authentication feature also provides instructions to compute and verify PAC
values. For our work, we use two pointer authentication instructions: PACDA and AUTDA.
The PACDA instruction computes and inserts a PAC for a data pointer using a context value
and data pointer key A, while the AUTDA instruction authenticates a data pointer using a
context value and data pointer key A [48]. If the authentication passes, the upper bits of
the pointer are restored to enable subsequent use of the pointer. If the authentication fails,
however, the upper bits are corrupted and any subsequent use of the pointer results in a
translation fault.
2.2.3 The Low-fat Memory Layout
In Section 2.3 we show how metadata can be kept to the minimum by using a low-fat
memory layout. The low-fat memory layout [49] subdivides a program’s virtual address
space into several regions. Each region is responsible for allocation of objects of a given
fixed size range. Figure 2.3 shows an example low-fat memory layout. On the figure region
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Figure 2.3 Low-fat Memory Layout. The low-fat memory layout subdivides a program’s virtual
address space into several regions. Region 0 is used for text and data segments, and a stack region is
used as program stack. Objects of a given size are allocated from a specific region. For example,
objects of size 32 bytes are allocated from region 2.
0 is reserved for program text and data segments, and a special region (stack region) is
assigned for the program stack. The rest of the regions contain sub-heaps for the low-fat
memory allocator. The low-fat memory allocator allocates objects of a given size from a
specific region. For example, suppose object sizes are restricted to be powers-of-two sizes,
and the minimum allocatable size is 16 bytes. In this case objects of size 1-16 bytes are
allocated from region 1, objects of size 17-32 bytes are allocated from region 2 and so on.
The low-fat memory layout allows for implicit encoding of object size information
in pointer values. The upper bits of a pointer indicate the region number which directly
corresponds to the size of the object the pointer references. In addition, the base pointer of
an object can be directly computed from any pointer to that object. This characteristics can
be used for efficient bounds checking [49].
In the next section we will show how a low-fat memory allocator can be used to further
reduce the overhead of our temporal safety technique.
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Figure 2.4 Metadata Storage and Access. The figure shows metadata storage for the two variants
of PETS and CETS. The first technique is for baseline PETS where one-level mapping is used to
map a memory object pointer to a lock pointer location. With this approach, two load operations
are required to get the lock value. The second technique is for PETS with low-fat allocator. This
technique doesn’t require storing a lock pointer, as the lock pointer is the same as the base pointer,
which is directly calculated from the pointer value. This approach requires only one load operation
to read the lock value. The last technique is used by CETS [9], which we catagorize as traditional
lock-and-key technique. CETS uses two-level lookup trie data structure to store metadata. With this
approach each metadata access requires four loads.
2.3 Pointer Authentication for Temporal Safety
Though effective, the traditional lock-and-key technique described in Section 2.2 incurs large
performance and memory overheads. In this work, we propose using pointer authentication
to reduce the performance and memory overhead of the traditional lock-and-key technique.
The proposed technique, which we call PETS, adapts the lock-and-key mechanism for
temporal safety, but instead of using explicit storage for keys, we propose using PACs
(Pointer Authentication Codes).
Allocation and Metadata Propagation: Figure 2.1 compares the traditional lock-and-
key technique with PETS. Similar to the traditional lock-and-key technique, each memory
allocation (memory object) is assigned a lock. When a pointer to that allocation is created
(using a memory allocation function such as malloc) a PAC value is computed and stored in
the unused bits of the pointer using the PACDA instruction (Figure 2.1(d)). This instruction
takes the pointer value and a 64-bit context value as inputs. We use the lock value as a
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context. When a new pointer is derived from an old pointer, for example through pointer
arithmetic, a PAC value is computed for the new pointer.
Pointer Dereference: On each pointer dereference, the PAC value of a pointer is verified
using the AUTDA instruction (Figure 2.1(e)). The AUTDA instruction computes a PAC
using the pointer value and the lock value and compares it with the PAC value stored in
the unused bits of the pointer. If the two PAC values do not match, the pointer is stale and
corrupted so that a translation fault is generated if the pointer is dereferenced
Deallocation: Finally, when the memory is deallocated, for example using free(), the lock
value is incremented, similar to the traditional lock-and-key technique (Figure 2.1(f)). On
subsequent accesses using a dangling pointer, PAC verification should fail since the lock
value has changed.
We explored two variants of PETS: PETS with shadow storage (we will refer to this
as baseline PETS for the rest of the paper) and low-fat PETS. Both variants use pointer
authentication; the only difference is the memory allocators they use. We discuss the two
variants in detail below.
2.3.1 PETS with Shadow Storage (Baseline PETS)
Baseline PETS uses the standard C library memory allocator (dlmalloc-based allocator).
Each heap memory object, regardless of the size of the object, keeps a 64-bit lock value.
In addition to this, a 64-bit pointer to the lock (lock pointer) is kept per the minimum
allocatable heap object. In our implementation the minimum size of a heap object is 32
bytes. Figure 2.4(a) shows how metadata is stored and accessed in the baseline PETS
implementation. We use one-level mapping to map a pointer value to its metadata (lock
pointer) location. With this mapping, the lock address is located at a fixed offset from the
pointer value. This way the lock pointer location can be calculated by a single shift and
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addition operations. On memory allocation, the memory allocator allocates metadata space
for the memory object if it is not already allocated and updates the value of the lock pointer
that corresponds to the new pointer.
The PETS compiler adds code to propagate metadata (including computing PAC) when-
ever a new pointer is derived from an old pointer. The code below shows the operations
performed on pointer propagation. The lock pointer is copied from the old pointer lock
pointer location to the new pointer lock pointer location. Then a PAC is computed for the
new pointer after loading the lock value.
1 / / Copy l o c k p o i n t e r
2 l o c k p t r a d d r = c o m p u t e l o c k p t r a d d r e s s ( o l d p t r )
3 o l d l o c k p t r = ∗ l o c k p t r a d d r
4 l o c k p t r a d d r = c o m p u t e l o c k p t r a d d r e s s ( n e w p t r )
5 ∗ l o c k p t r a d d r = o l d l o c k p t r
6 / / Compute PAC
7 l o c k = ∗ o l d l o c k p t r
8 PACDA new pt r , l o c k
Listing 2.2 Baseline PETS - Metadata Propagation Code
The PETS compiler also adds code to verify PAC values on every relevant load and
store as shown on the code below. The verification code first loads the lock that corresponds
to the pointer from the metadata location. If the lock matches the lock used during PAC
computation, then the verification should pass. When the memory object is freed, the
memory allocator increments the lock value.
1 / / Load l o c k and v e r i f y PAC
2 l o c k p t r a d d r = c o m p u t e l o c k p t r a d d r e s s ( p t r )
3 l o c k p t r = ∗ l o c k p t r a d d r
4 l o c k = ∗ l o c k p t r
5 AUTDA p t r , l o c k
Listing 2.3 Baseline PETS - PAC Verification Code
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2.3.2 Low-fat PETS
The baseline technique can be further optimized if a low-fat memory allocator is used instead
of a dlmalloc-based allocator. In this technique, similar to the baseline PETS, each heap
memory object keeps a 64-bit lock value at the base of the memory object (i.e. at the base
pointer). With low-fat memory layout the base pointer of a memory object can be calculated
from a pointer value, therefore there is no need to keep a lock pointer metadata. Figure 2.4(b)
shows how metadata is stored and accessed for the low-fat based PETS implementation. For
our implementation we used powers-of-two sizes for the heap objects with a minimum heap
object size of 16 bytes. With this implementation, the base pointer can be calculated by
fast logical shift and AND operations. The code below shows the operations for metadata
propagation. Unlike baseline PETS, there is no need to copy metadata during propagation:
only PAC computation for the new pointer is performed.
1 b a s e p t r = compute base po in ter ( n e w p t r )
2 l o c k = ∗ b a s e p t r
3 PACDA new pt r , l o c k
Listing 2.4 Low-fat PETS - Metadata Propagation Code
In addition to this, on pointer dereference, the lock value is directly loaded from the base
pointer, requiring only one load operation to read the lock value.
1 b a s e p t r = compute base po in ter ( p t r )
2 l o c k = ∗ b a s e p t r
3 AUTDA p t r , l o c k
Listing 2.5 Low-fat PETS - PAC Verification Code
As a comparison with the closest related work, Figure 2.4(c) shows the metadata storage
technique used by CETS [9], which we catagorize as traditional lock-and-key technique.
CETS uses two-level lookup trie data structure to store metadata. It stores key and lock
pointer metadata for each pointer. The upper x bits of a pointer address are used to index
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the primary trie structure and the lower y bits are used to index the secondary trie structure.
With this approach each metadata access requires four loads as opposed to only one load
operation for low-fat PETS.
As we will show in Section 2.5, the metadata storage and access technique significantly
affects the performance of the lock-and-key technique.
2.4 PETS Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementation details of PETS. We describe the two
components of PETS: the PETS compiler instrumentation and the memory allocators.
2.4.1 PETS Compiler Instrumentation
PETS instruments code as described in Section 2.3. We implemented the compiler instru-
mentation with an LLVM [50] pass we call UAF detector pass. Algorithm 2.1 shows the
algorithm for UAF detector pass. The pass checks each instruction to determine whether it
is a pointer arithmetic instruction or a memory access instruction. For a pointer arithmetic
instruction, it inserts the code on Listing 2.2 or Listing 2.4 after the instruction, depending on
the variant of PETS used. Similarly, for a memory access instruction the code on Listing 2.3
or Listing 2.5 is inserted before the instruction.
Like mentioned earlier, stack use-after-free errors are rare, therefore PETS targets heap
use-after-free errors. For this reason, no instrumentation code is inserted if a pointer is
statically (at compile time) determined to point to the stack or global data. However, it is not
always possible to determine where a pointer points to at compile time, therefore code that
dynamically checks whether the pointer is within the bounds of the heap is inserted at the
beginning of the instrumentation code. In a typical address space layout, the heap is located
above the .bss section and below the stack, therefore the rest of the instrumentation code is
bypassed if the pointer is greater than or equal to the stack pointer, or it is less than the end
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Algorithm 2.1 Algorithm for UAF Detector Pass
1: procedure INSTRUMENTFUNCTION(Function F)
2: for Instruction I in F do
3: if pointerArithmeticInst (I) then
4: ptr← getSrcPtr(I)
5: if isGlobalVar (ptr) —— isStackVar (ptr) then
6: continue
7: instrumentPtrArithmetic (I) . Listing 1 or 3
8: else if memoryAccessInst (I) then
9: ptr← getAddress(I)
10: if isGlobalVar (ptr) —— isStackVar (ptr) then
11: continue
12: instrumentMemoryAccess (I) . Listing 2 or 4
of the .bss section (bss end) as shown below. PETS doesn’t need to know where the start or
the end of the heap is, therefore it is compatible with ASLR.
1 / / Bypass check i f p o i n t e r p o i n t s t o d a t a
2 / / i n t h e s t a c k o r d a t a s e c t i o n
3 i f ( p t r >= s t a c k p t r )
4 go to end
5 i f ( p t r < b s s e n d )
6 go to end
7 / / Res t o f i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n code
8 end :
Compiler Optimizations
The PETS compiler eliminates redundant pointer dereference checks similar to [9]. Given a
memory access instruction I that uses a pointer, if the instruction is dominated by an earlier
check of the pointer and there is no call to a free() function between I and the check, then no
check is inserted before I.
The PETS compiler doesn’t perform inter-procedural analysis to determine calls to free,
instead we conservatively assume any function call would potentially free any memory
object. With this approach we were able to remove a significant number of redundant check
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on some benchmarks as shown on Figure 2.5.
2.4.2 Memory Allocators
As detailed in Section 2.3, we evaluated two variants of PETS. The two variants use different
memory allocators.
Baseline PETS: The baseline PETS uses a dlmalloc-based memory allocator. For our
implementation, we modified the musl C library memory allocator. Specifically, we made
the following modifications:
• The chunk struct which maintains metadata for memory chunks (memory objects)
was modified to include a lock element.
• Memory allocation functions ( malloc, calloc, realloc) were modified to include a
routine that allocates metadata space and initializes the lock pointer value in the
metadata space.
• On free, the lock value for the corresponding chunk is incremented by 1.
During the memory allocation or freeing process, memory objects can be split or merged
together. The value of the lock in the memory object needs to account for these operations.
When a memory object is split into two, the new memory object inherits the lock value
of the parent memory object. When two memory objects are merged together, if the two
objects have different lock values, the larger lock value is taken as the lock value of the new
object. This insures that a lock value is never reset back to an older value.
Low-fat PETS: The low-fat PETS implementation uses a low-fat memory allocator. We
used a modified version of a low-fat allocator implementation provided at [51]. We config-
ured the allocator to use powers-of-two sizes. There are 30 possible heap object sizes with a
minimum allocation size of 16B and a maximum size of 8GB. There are 32 regions in total
including the stack region and region 0 which is used for code and data sections as shown
in Figure2.3. In our implementations, we assume a 39-bit virtual address space which is
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the default for the Linux kernel on AArch64 [27]. The most significant 5 bits are used to
indicate the memory object size. This leaves 34 bits to index a region.
With this setting the compute base pointer function on Listings 2.4 and 2.5 is imple-
mented as:
1 compute base po in ter ( p t r ) {
2 s i z e = p t r >> 34
3 mask = 0x7FFFFFFFF8 << s i z e
4 b a s e p t r = p t r & mask
5 r e t u r n b a s e p t r
6 }
We made the following modifications to the memory allocator to enable use-after-free
protection:
• A lock value is added at the base address of each allocation.
• On free, the lock value is incremented by 1.
2.4.3 Support for Multithreaded Applications
Multithreaded applications present a challenge for memory safety techniques. One issue is a
potential data race when accessing shared metadata structures. For example, CETS uses
a shared next key counter that is incremented whenever a memory object is allocated [9].
To avoid races, either accesses to the counter need to be synchronized or each thread need
to keep its own counter. PETS doesn’t have such issues because metadata is kept for each
memory object.
However there are situations where temporal safety might be violated if the multi-
threaded application is not properly synchronized. For example, between an address check
and a memory object access, another thread might free the memory object, resulting in
missed violation. PETS supports multithreaded programs without any change as long as the
programs are properly synchronized (i.e. they are data-race free).
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2.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we discuss the evaluation of PETS. We evaluated the runtime and memory
overheads of the two variants of PETS and compared them with other temporal safety
techniques. We start by detailing our setup for the evaluations.
2.5.1 Experimental Setup
Pointer Authentication Implementation
PETS makes use of the ARM pointer authentication extension. ARM pointer authentication
extension is a feature of the new ARMv8.3-A ISA specification. At the time of the writing of
this paper there were no hardware implementations that support ARMv8.3-A, therefore we
had to model the pointer authentication feature. Specifically we modeled the two instructions
used by our technique (i.e. PACDA and AUTDA instructions).
Correctness Evaluation: To evaluate the correctness of our technique (i.e. to verify that
programs behave correctly with PETS instrumentation), we modeled the two instructions in
the QEMU emulator [52]. We ran SPECCPU2006 benchmarks and verified the correctness
of the outputs.
Runtime Overhead Evaluation: To evaluate runtime overhead, we modeled PACDA
and AUTDA instructions in the gem5 cycle-accurate simulator [53]. In our gem5 model
we assumed there is a single separate functional unit that performs pointer authentication
related operations such as computing a PAC value as shown in Figure 2.2 and comparing
the result of a PAC computation with a PAC value stored in a pointer. We modeled the
PAC computation to take 8 cycles at a CPU frequency of 1.5 GHz based on the results of
QARMA encryption latency given at [47].
Our tests using the model in gem5 revealed that the contribution in runtime overhead of
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PAC computation and verification is negligible compared to the rest of PETS instrumentation
code (For example, on baseline PETS, there are two loads per memory access check). For
this reason and because running large benchmarks (such as SPECCPU2006 benchmarks)
to completion in a cycle-accurate simulator takes a very long time, runtime evaluations are
done on a real hardware by replacing PACDA and AUTDA instructions with NOPs.
PAC Size: In our implementations, we assume a 39-bit address space. That means there
are 24 bits for PACs. Each memory object has a separate 64-bit lock value which is incre-
mented whenever the memory object is freed. However due to the limited number of PAC
bits we essentially have a 24-bit entropy. It is possible to get collusions during the lifetime
of a memory object. The PETS memory allocator stops reallocating a memory object when
the lock value overflows.
Evaluation Platform
As mentioned earlier, our model of the pointer authentication instructions in the gem5
simulator showed that the effect of pointer authentication instructions on the performance of
the overall system is negligible. Therefore, all the evaluations in this section are performed
on a real hardware. Note that only runtime is affected by pointer authentication instructions
- memory overhead is not affected by the instructions.
Specifically we used the Xilinx ZCU102 evaluation board [54] for our evaluations. The
board includes four ARM Cortex-A53 cores with 32kB L1 instruction and data caches and a
1MB shared L2 cache. The board also includes a 4GB DDR4 DRAM.
Benchmarks: We used the C benchmarks from SPECCPU2006 for our evaluations. We
used the default -O2 optimization when compiling the benchmarks.
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Figure 2.5 Percentage of Redundant Memory Access Checks Removed by PETS Compiler
Optimization.
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Figure 2.6 PETS Runtime Overhead. The graph shows the runtime overhead of the two variants
of PETS for SPEC2006 benchmarks. In almost all benchmarks low-fat PETS performs better than
baseline PETS. Most of the overhead for PETS comes from memory access checks. We can see
a correlation between the overhead and the percentage of redundant checks removed shown on
Figure 2.5. The benchmarks with the highest overhead are the ones with the least optimization.
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2.5.2 Runtime Overhead:
We measured the runtime overhead of the two variants of PETS. For the evaluation, the
benchmarks were compiled with the redundant check optimization discussed in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of redundant memory access checks removed by the
optimization. As shown in the figure, the optimization removed a significant number of
redundant checks.
Figure 2.6 shows the runtime overheads of the two variants of PETS as compared to a
baseline system without PETS instrumentation. As shown in the figure, lowfat-based PETS
performs better on all the benchmarks except libquantum and lbm. This is attributed to the
smaller number of loads per memory access checks for lowfat-based PETS. The two excep-
tions are due to the overhead of the low-fat memory allocator outweighing the overhead of
the instrumentation. We can see a correlation between the percentage of redundant checks
removed and the runtime overhead. Benchmarks that have the highest overheads (perlbench,
hmmer and sphinx3) are also the ones with the least optimization. In summary, low-fat
PETS has an average overhead of 57.12% while baseline PETS has an average overhead of
132.86%.
2.5.3 Memory Overhead
We also evaluated the physical memory overhead of PETs. Figure 2.7 shows the memory
overhead of the two variants of PETS. The memory overhead was calculated using readings
from the /proc/pid/status file in Linux by adding the peak resident set size (vmHWM), page
table entries size (VmPTE) and size of second-level page tables (VmPDE).
As shown on the figure, low-fat based PETS has a very low memory overhead averaging
at 1.9%. Most of the overhead for low-fat PETS comes from the low-fat allocator itself.
Baseline PETS has an average overhead of 28.4%. This is expected as 8-byte lock pointer
metadata is kept for every 32-byte memory object. Ideally, this would result in a memory
29
82.73%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
M
em
o
ry
 O
ve
rh
ea
d
Baseline PETS
Low-fat PETS
Figure 2.7 PETS Memory Overhead. The graph shows the physical memory overhead for the
two variants of PETS. From the graph we can see that low-fat PETS has a very low memory overhead
as it almost entirely avoids using metadata. Note that h264ref has negative overhead for low-fat
PETS. This is attributed to the low-fat memory allocator being more efficient than the baseline
dlmalloc-based allocator.
overhead of 25%. The extra overhead comes from addition of a lock metadata per allocated
memory object and the associated object alignment requirement.
2.5.4 Comparison with other Temporal Safety Techniques
The related work section discusses in detail the pros and cons of related temporal safety
techniques, here we compare performance of PETS with some of these techniques. All
the other techniques were implemented and evaluated on an X86 system and on different
microarchitecture than ours, therefore we don’t do a direct comparison of runtime overhead.
However, we do a direct comparison of memory overhead as it is independent of architecture.
Comparison with CETS: CETS [9] is a lock-and-key technique that uses a disjoint meta-
data per pointer as shown on Figure 2.4. It is the closest work to PETS. CETS needs four
load operations per metadata access, while lowfat-PETS needs only one, therefore CETS is
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expected to have a higher runtime overhead as compared to PETS.
Table 2.1 compares memory overhead of low-fat-based PETS with CETS. The original
CETS paper doesn’t provide memory overhead results. We estimated the overhead of
CETS from the results given at the follow-up work SoftBoundCETS [17]. SoftBoundCETS
provides both temporal and spatial memory safety. It keeps four 64-bit values (lock, key,
base and bounds) as metadata per pointer while CETS keeps only two of the values (lock and
key). Therefore we estimated that temporal protection alone (CETS) contributes to at least
half of the memory overhead of SoftBoundCETS. The numbers for CETS in Table 2.1 are
half of that is given for SoftBoundCETS at [17]. The numbers for some of the benchmarks
are left blank since data is not available. From the table, we can see that low-fat PETS has
far lower memory overhead than CETS on almost all the benchmarks. The average overhead
for CETS for the benchmarks where data is available (92%) is much higher than even the
baseline PETS (28.4%).
Comparison with DangSan and DangNull: Another temporal safety technique keeps
track of all pointers to a memory object. When the memory object is deallocated, the
values of all pointers to that object are corrupted by for example setting the values to NULL.
DangSan [11] and DangNull [12] are such two techniques.
These techniques do not need to instrument pointer dereferences as the memory man-
agment unit (MMU) performs null checks in hardware. The overhead for these techniques
comes from traversing pointer tracking data structures during allocation and deallocation of
memory objects. This means these techniques have better runtime performance than PETS
on applications that do not allocate/deallocate memory frequently. However for benchmarks
that create 100s of millions of objects, such as perlbench, we expect PETS to perform better.
In terms of memory overhead, as shown on Table 2.1, DangNull’s and DangSan’s over-
head vary greatly depending on the benchmark, but overall lowfat-based PETS performs
much better (1.9% average overhead for low-fat PETS vs. 212% average for DangNull and
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Benchmark Memory Overhead (%)
Low-fat
PETS DangNull DangSan Oscar CETS
bzip2 0.07 0 0 0 -
gobmk 2.04 21 120 0 250
h264ref -6.90 373 16 10 190
hmmer 4.75 1700 30 33 -
lbm 0 0 1 0 40
libquant 0.23 0 2 5 0
mcf 0.20 0 62 0 -
milc 1.14 0 25 16 55
perlbench 8.44 - 380 225 -
sjeng -0.02 0 2 0 0
sphinx3 10.82 34.7 180 400 110
Table 2.1 Memory Overhead Comparison. The table compares the physical memory overhead
of low-fat PETS with other temporal safety techniques. From the table we can see that low-fat PETS
has by far the least overhead.
74% average for DangSan).
Comparison with Oscar: Oscar [10] is a recently proposed page-permission-based tem-
poral safety technique. Oscar doesn’t instrument code - its overhead originates from creating
shadow pages during allocations. For this reason, Oscar has low runtime overhead for appli-
cations that do not allocate memory frequently. However, PETS has much lower memory
overhead than Oscar (1.9% average for lowfat-PETS vs. 62% average for Oscar for the
benchmarks on Table 2.1).
In summary, low-fat PETS by far has the least memory overhead compared to the other
temporal safety techniques on Table 2.1. The runtime overhead of PETS is expected to be
lower than other lock-and-key techniques such as CETS.
2.6 Related Work
In this section we review previous work, focusing on temporal safety techniques.
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2.6.1 Temporal Safety Techniques
Table 3.6 categorizes the different temporal safety techniques based on the technique used
to provide protection against use-after-free errors and the type of metadata management
used. The categories are based on [26]. Below we discuss about the pros and cons of each
temporal safety and metadata management technique.
Lock-and-key: PETS is based on the lock-and-key temporal safety technique. The lock-
and-key technique can detect all use-after-free errors. The performance of a lock-and-key
techniques depends on the type of metadata management used. Safe-C [14] and W. Xu et
al [25] use fat pointers to store unique capabilities (similar to keys). CETS [9] and Watch-
Dog [18] use disjoint metadata space to store per-pointer lock and key. Both techniques
require a change in the calling convention if a pointer is used as an argument to a function, as
metadata need to travel with the pointer. With PETS on the other hand, PACs are embedded
in pointers, therefore there is no need to transform function declarations. In addition to this,
the use of per-memory-object metadata as opposed to per-pointer metadata makes PETS
more efficient than other lock-and-key techniques.
Dangling Pointer Tagging: One way of detecting dangling pointer dereferences is to
keep track of all pointers to a memory object and to corrupt the pointers, for example by
nullifying them, when the object is freed. Then subsequent dangling pointer dereferences
would result in address translation fault. Undangle [55], FreeSentry [13], DangNull [12] and
DangSan [11] use this technique. These techniques add instrumentation in code that maps a
newly created pointer to a memory object. FreeSentry and Dangsan use a two-level lookup
table to map the newly created pointer to a memory object. Then they record the address
of the pointer in a linked list associated with the memory object. When an object is freed,
the linked list associated with object is traversed to invalidate the pointers to that object.
DangNull is a similar techniques, but instead of multi-level shadow, it uses red-black tree
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to track point-to relations. These techniques do not need to instrument pointer deferences,
therefore have lower runtime overhead compared to lock-and-key techniques. However, on
applications that perform many allocations, their overhead can be high. Furthermore, as
shown in Table 2.1, the techniques are very memory intensive, especially on applications
that perform many allocations.
Page-permissions-based: Another temporal safety technique involves assigning new vir-
tual and/or physical pages for each allocation. On deallocation, the permissions on the virtual
pages are changed so that dangling pointer dereferences are detected through page faults.
The naive approach of assigning new physical pages for each allocation used by Electric
Fence [57] and PageHeap [58] has impracticality high physical memory overhead. To get
around this problem, D. Dhurjati et al [59] proposed using aliased virtual pages. In this
scheme, a new virtual page for each allocation is used, but instead of using a new physical
page, same physical page as the original program is used. On deallocation, individual virtual
pages corresponding to the freed object are disabled and are never remapped. One drawback
of this scheme is that applications with many allocations can exhaust physical memory
due to accumulation of data structures that the operating system maintains for disabled
virtual pages. Oscar [10] proposed using ”high water mark” when creating virtual shadows
and unmapping old shadows when a memory object is freed. This reduces the amount of
accumulated data structures.
Page-permission-based schemes in general do not require code instrumentation and do
not keep explicit metadata, therefore have better compatibility and low runtime overheads.
However, similar to dangling pointer tagging, allocation intensive applications can have
high runtime and memory overheads.
Probabilistic/ Memory-reuse Delay: Randomized memory allocators [63, 64] places
memory objects randomly across a heap such that the probability of a newly-free object
being reallocated is low. Probabilistic techniques can be attacked by deliberately making
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large allocations, therefore forcing reuse of freed objects.
Some memory error detection tools [60, 62, 65, 61] detect use-after-free errors by delay-
ing (putting the object in quarantine) reallocation of memory objects after they are freed.
They detect accesses to quarantined objects by disabling access to the objects or filling the
objects with patterns and looking for those patterns when memory is accessed. Detection
accuracy of delay-based techniques depends on how long a freed object stays in quarantine,
and do not guarantee detection of all use-after-free errors.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented PETS, a temporal safety technique that utilizes authenticated
pointers to reduce the space used for metadata storage. PETS adopts the lock-and-key
temporal safety technique, but instead of storing key metadata for a pointer in memory,
PETS stores it in the unused bits of the pointer itself. This reduces the total metadata stored
in memory allowing for fast metadata access. PETS has better compatibility and lower
memory and runtime overheads compared to previous lock-and-key techniques, and has the
least memory overhead compared to other temporal safety techniques. PETS thereby brings
the lock-and-key technique a step closer to being used as a practical runtime use-after-free
detection mechanism.
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Chapter 3
Efficient Software Fault Isolation for
IoT-Class Devices
3.1 Introduction
Embedded devices are everywhere, with low-end embedded devices being used in many
critical systems such as medical, industrial, and automotive applications. With the Internet-
of-Things (IoT) promising as much as 30 billion connected devices by 2020, the security of
low-end embedded devices has become a major concern. The rising number of devices along
with increased connectivity has immensely exacerbated the attack surface of this class of
devices, making them a genuine target of interest for saavy attackers. Two recent examples
of this trend include the Jeep remote kill attack [66] and the Mirai IoT-based botnet [67].
While the exposure to attacks is increasing, the security mechanisms in these systems re-
main mediocre due to the tight resource (e.g., computing power and memory size) and price
constraints. Recent works have shown that embedded devices suffer from the same memory
corruption vulnerabilities that have plagued traditional computing systems [28, 30, 29].
In [30] a stack overflow vulnerability inside an ARM Cortex-R4 processor embedded in a
Wi-Fi chip was used to execute arbitrary code and ultimately take over a mobile device by
Wi-Fi proximity alone.
Low-end embedded systems typically operate in a single address space with tightly-
coupled software components (e.g., RTOS kernels, peripheral drivers, libraries, etc.) without
any form of isolation between software components. These software components often
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come from different chip, sensor and I/O device vendors, which ultimately raises serious
questions as to whether or not these devices can be trusted. Software modules might contain
bugs or even malicious code that could be used to compromise the security of the whole
system. Consequently, there is a great need to provide IoT-class devices with low-cost,
reliable protections against widely employed attacks, such as memory corruption and code
injection.
In this chapter, we leverage the rudimentary memory protection support found in mod-
ern IoT-class microcontrollers to build a low-profile, low-overhead, flexible sandboxing
mechanism that can provide isolation between tightly-coupled software modules. With our
approach, named uSFI, only the trust management code need to be trusted. Through the use
of a static verifier and monitored inter-module transitions, module code at all privilege levels
(including the kernel) is able to run uninstrumented and untrusted code. We implemented
uSFI on an ARMv7-M based processor, both bare metal and running the freeRTOS kernel,
and analyzed the performance using the MiBench embedded benchmark suite and two
additional highly detailed applications. We found that performance overheads were minimal,
with at most 1.1% slowdown, and code size overheads were also low, at a maximum of 10%.
In addition, our trusted code base was trivially small at only 150 lines of code.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we outline the
threat model for this work. Section 3.3 discusses the details of uSFI system architecture.
Section 3.4 details our implementation of uSFI for the ARMv7-M architecture. In Sec-
tion 3.5, we evaluate uSFI using representative embedded benchmarks and other real-world
applications. In Section 3.6, we discuss related work in the area of software-based fault
isolation and embedded device security, and finally we draw conclusions in Section 3.7.
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3.2 Threat Model
The goal of uSFI is to protect the code and data of software modules from being leaked or
corrupted by other compromised or malicious modules. In a uSFI-enabled system, software
modules (library code, drivers, etc.) are untrusted (i.e., they might contain software bugs or
malicious code that lead to compromised execution). Modules can execute any code within
their sandbox, including attacker selected code gadgets [6, 68].
A compromised module will try to execute attacker code by overwriting code memory,
executing data, or forming gadgets out of existing code. Furthermore, a corrupted module
will try to corrupt the data memory or read sensitive data such as encryption keys from the
memory of other modules. Finally, a compromised module will try to gain elevated access
to I/O to gain access to a remote controller or leak sensitive information.
Unlike other low-end fault isolation systems, we assume the kernel is not trusted. Simi-
larly, the system compiler is not trusted, instead a trusted verifier is used to verify module
code generated by the compiler. The uSFI verifier and the uSFI runtime are the only trusted
software components. We assume the underlying hardware is trusted. Finally, we also
assume there is a trusted bootloader that verifies and loads binaries at system startup.
3.3 uSFI System Architecture
The goal of uSFI is to protect code and data from untrusted software modules. Untrusted
software modules include core modules, third party libraries, drivers, and operating system
kernels. This is achieved by sandboxing modules in their own security domain and using a
well-defined interface for cross-domain procedure calls. In this section, we provide details
of the uSFI architecture.
A uSFI-enabled system has two components: a trusted runtime and untrusted modules.
The uSFI runtime is the only trusted component in the system, and it has access to the entire
memory and sole access to the memory protection resources. Software modules, including
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Figure 3.1 uSFI System Components. A uSFI-enabled system is composed of a trusted runtime
and sandboxed untrusted modules. Modules might include drivers, libraries and user applications. In
an embedded system that uses an RTOS kernel, the kernel is also considered untrusted (i.e., it can
not read/write system configuration and control resources, and modules’ memory). Each module has
its own code and data regions. A module can only access its own data or other modules’ public data.
In addition to this, a module can only access peripherals assigned to it. Sandboxing of modules is
facilitated by the use of readily available Memory Protection Unit (MPU) hardware. An MPU allows
partitioning memory into regions and assigning attributes and access permissions to each region.
the kernel and drivers, are all untrusted. A module represents a single security domain
with its own code, data and peripheral memory regions. Figure 3.1 illustrates this isolation
capability. A module can only execute code that resides in its code region, and it can only
access data belonging to itself or public data in other modules. Furthermore, a module can
only access peripherals assigned to it.
3.3.1 Module Privilege Levels
Typically code running at privileged level (e.g., kernel code) has access to all system re-
sources including system control and configuration resources. In a uSFI-enabled system,
however, even a privileged code module is sandboxed such that it only has access to memory
regions assigned to it. This is achieved by adding a third privilege level, restricted-privileged
level, in addition to privileged and unprivileged levels. In the restricted-privileged level, a
module has access to privileged instructions, but its memory access is still restricted such
that it cannot compromise the uSFI runtime. As such, it has no access to the memory
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management resource as well as other modules’ memory regions.
There are currently multiple ways to achieve this restricted-privileged access level. The
first method is to augment memory load and store instructions inside a privileged module
with address check instructions. Another method is to force all untrusted software to operate
at the unprivileged level and call trusted privileged code when privileged operations are
needed. Unfortunately, both of these methods incur significant performance overheads.
uSFI, on the other hand, uses a novel approach that takes advantage of unprivileged memory
access instructions. With this approach, a privileged module is forced to use unprivileged
memory access instructions that grant access to only the memory that the uSFI runtime
permits it to access, instead of allowing carte blanche memory access with privileged loads
and stores. These unprivileged instructions perform the same operations as privileged load
and store instructions except that the MPU continues to enforce uSFI delineated memory
access domains. This method incurs negligible performance overheads.
Through the use of a static binary verification mechanism, the restricted-privileged
module (e.g., an RTOS kernel) is not allowed access to memory configuration registers;
however, it still can perform many privileged tasks without requiring the trusted uSFI run-
time’s help. For example, in the ARMv7-M architecture, a widely used architecture in
embedded devices, a restricted-privileged module will have access to system instructions
(MSR and MRS instructions). These instructions are used to read and write special purpose
registers. For example, use of these instructions can enable, disable or change interrupt
priorities through access to the BASEPRI register. There are, however, a few cases where a
restricted-privileged module needs the help of the uSFI runtime. In particular when context
switching between tasks. In such cases, the module issues a supervisor call to the runtime to
request the required service.
To summarize, there are three privilege levels in a uSFI-enabled system: privileged,
unprivileged and restricted-privileged. Only the uSFI runtime runs at the privileged level.
Modules run in either unprivileged or restricted-privileged levels. This approach ensures that
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Table 3.1 uSFI Privilege Levels and Allowed Access. The table shows the three privilege levels
in a uSFI-enabled system and the accesses allowed at each privilege level. The uSFI runtime code
is the only software that runs in privileged level. Modules can only have either unprivileged or
restricted-privileged privilege levels.
Access Type
Privilege Levels
Privileged Unprivileged
Restricted-
privileged
Module’s memory Accessible Accessible Accessible
Other modules’
private memory
Accessible Inaccessible Inaccessible
System control
block
Accessible Inaccessible Inaccessible
System
instructions
Accessible Inaccessible Accessible
even if a privileged code such as an RTOS kernel is compromised, other modules’ memory
is safe from being leaked or altered by privileged malicious code. Table 3.1 shows what
accesses are allowed under each privilege level. An unprivileged module only has access
to its own memory and other modules’ public data. A restricted-privileged module has
additional access to system instructions, but it can not access system control resources such
as MPU configuration registers and other modules’ private memory.
3.3.2 Memory Isolation
uSFI protects module memory from compromised or malicious modules. To achieve this, it
uses a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) hardware available in many embedded processors.
The MPU divides the memory map into regions and defines access permissions and memory
attributes for each region. In a uSFI-enabled system, the memory map is divided into two
parts: uSFI memory and module memory. uSFI memory is a small portion of the memory
map used by the uSFI runtime. This portion of memory is inaccessible by any of the modules.
The rest of memory (module memory) is freely accessible by the corresponding module
code. Each module memory region is divided into code, stack, read-only data, private and
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Table 3.2 Access Permission Configuration for Module Memory Regions. The table shows MPU
access permission configuration for an active module. The module region is configured to be ac-
cessible by both privileged (the uSFI runtime) and the currently active unprivileged code. Data and
peripheral regions are non-executable (NX). Other modules’ regions are left unconfigured, which
makes them accessible by only the uSFI runtime.
Module Memory
Region
Unprivileged/Privileged
Permissions
Code RO, X
Read-only Data RO, NX
Stack RW, NX
Data RW, NX
Peripherals RW, NX
public data (bss, data and heap), and peripheral regions.
In a uSFI enabled system, only a single module is active at a time. Inter-module calls
are managed by the uSFI runtime. On the invocation of a new module’s function, the MPU
configuration is changed to reflect the access permissions of the new module. Table 3.2
shows the access permission configuration for each region of the active module. As shown in
the table, each region has distinct permission requirements. Data is not executable, therefore
all data regions (i.e., read-only data, stack and data) are configured as non-executable (NX).
The module regions are configured to be accessible by privileged and unprivileged code, i.e.,
the active module and the uSFI runtime have access to these regions. The active module
only has access to the configured regions. Other modules’ regions (unconfigured regions)
are made inaccessible to non-privileged code by use of the MPU hardware.
3.3.3 uSFI Compiler and Verifier
uSFI is composed of a uSFI compiler with a verifier and a uSFI runtime. The uSFI compiler
generates a binary that conforms to the constraints discussed below. Figure 3.2 shows the
steps of generating a binary in a uSFI-enabled system. A programmer specifies module
configurations for each module through a uSFI API. The configurations include the module
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Figure 3.2 uSFI Compiler and Verifier. The figure shows the process of generating a binary and
MPU configurations in a uSFI-enabled system. Module configurations are provided for each module
through the uSFI API and include the module number, the privilege level of the module and the
peripheral access permissions of the module. The uSFI compiler uses the configuration information
to allocate memory to modules in module memory. The compiler also generates MPU register
configurations to be used by the uSFI runtime. A uSFI verifier ensures that the compiler-generated
binary satisfies the restrictions set on module instructions.
number, privilege level, peripheral access permissions, and entry function. Based on this
information, the compiler selects module memory region sizes and allocates regions to
modules. The compiler also generates MPU configurations to be used by the uSFI runtime.
After compilation, a static verifier ensures that the generated binary satisfies restrictions
set by uSFI. The restrictions depend on the privilege level of the module and are listed
below:
1) Modules can only issue supervisor calls that are assigned to them: Modules issue
supervisor calls when they want to make cross-module procedure calls. To keep cross-
module call overhead low, the uSFI runtime keeps the amount of checks required during
module transition to the minimum. Modules are identified by a unique module number.
When a module wants to call a function in a different module, it issues a supervisor call with
the callee’s module number as an argument. The runtime identifies the module to switch
to using this number. However, it doesn’t check the source of the call. It is up to the uSFI
verifier to make sure that modules issue only allowed supervisor calls (i.e., supervisor calls
with the right module numbers).
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Instruction0 Instruction1
Illegal Instruction
16 bit 16 bit 16 bit
Original 
Instruction 
Illegal
Instruction 
Example (a): Illegal store instruction from two legal                              
instructions 
LSL       r8, r9, r2
MOVS r0, #0x11    strb r2, [r2, r1, LSL #1]
Instruction0
16 bit 16 bit
Original 
Instruction 
Illegal 
Instruction
Illegal
Instruction 
Example (b): Illegal supervisor call instruction   
from store instruction 
STR sp, [rn, 0xFXX]  SVC XX
Where XX = 8-bit hexadecimal value, 
rn = Register value
(a) (b)
NOPFix
Instruction0 Instruction1
Example (c): New instruction sequence after fixing    
the sequence in example (a)
LSL       r8, r9, r2
NOP
MOVS r0, #0x11
Example (d): New instruction sequence after fixing    
the sequence in example (b)
STR sp, [rn, 0xFXX] MOV rt, 0xF
LSL    rt, rt, #8
ADD  rt, 0xXX                                                     
STR sp, [rn, rt]
Fix: Convert the 32-bit instruction to a set of equivalent                     
16-bit instructions 
(c) (d)
Figure 3.3 Potential Illegal Instructions and How to Fix Them. The figure shows how instructions
that violate uSFI restrictions can be formed, and how the uSFI compiler fixes them by taking the
ARMv7-M architecture as an example. In (a) a 32-bit illegal instruction is formed by jumping into
the middle of a 32-bit instruction and combining it with the next 16-bit instruction. Example (a)
shows how this can be used to execute an illegal store operation in a restricted-privileged module. To
fix this, the uSFI compiler simply inserts a NOP instruction between the two instructions, as shown
in (c). (b) shows how a 16-bit instruction is formed by jumping into the middle of a 32-bit instruction.
This can be used to execute an arbitrary supervisor call as shown in example (b). The uSFI compiler
fixes this by replacing the 32-bit instruction into 16-bit instruction sequence, as shown in (d).
2) Privileged modules can access memory using only unprivileged (and thus MPU
checked) memory access instructions: In a uSFI-enabled system all code except the
uSFI runtime has restricted access to memory. To enforce this, modules with a restricted-
privileged level can not use privileged load and store instructions.
In a uSFI-enabled system the uSFI compiler is not part of the trusted computing base.
The compiler is expected to generates code that satisfies the above restrictions by ensuring
that all code is discoverable at compile time. However, the correctness of the code doesn’t
solely rely on the rather large compiler. Instead, compiler generated code has to be vetted by
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PC: LDR rt, [PC + offset]
.
.
.
PC + offset: Embedded Data
MOVT rt, Embedded Data[31:16]
MOVW rt, Embedded Data[15:0]
Figure 3.4 PC-relative Load Instruction and its Conversion to Safe Move InstructionsThe figure
shows how the uSFI compiler removes data embedded in the code segment by taking the ARMv7-M
architecture as an example. In the original code a PC-relative load instruction loads data embedded
in the code segment. This code is unsafe since illegal instructions can be formed by jumping into the
embedded data. The uSFI compiler removes the embedded data by replacing the load instruction
with two 16-bit immediate move instructions.
the trusted verifier before it is ready for execution. The vetting process ensures that all code
is discoverable at compile time (i.e., it is impossible to form new unexpected instructions at
runtime).
In modern architectures, it is possible to form new instructions at runtime that are not
observed at compile time through code gadgets that jump into the middle of code and data.
For example, in the ARMv7-M architecture this can happen in two ways. First, due to the
variable instruction encoding in the ARMv7-M architecture, it is possible to jump into the
middle of an instruction and form new instructions. ARMv7-M uses the Thumb-2 instruction
set which supports both 32-bit and 16-bit instructions [69]. Instructions are stored half-word
(16 bits) aligned and 16-bit and 32-bit instructions can be intermixed freely. Therefore it is
possible to form illegal instructions at runtime by: 1) executing two 16-bit instructions as a
single 32-bit instruction, or 2) jumping into the middle of a 32-bit instruction and executing
the lower half of the instruction.
Figure 3.3 illustrates this potential vulnerability, and our remedy to prevent it from
creating illegal code sequences. In Figure 3.3 (a) an example is given on how an illegal
store instruction can be constructed by jumping into the middle of a 32-bit instruction and
combining it with the next 16-bit instruction. Assuming the code resides inside a module
with a restricted-privilege level, this violates the second restriction stated above. Figure 3.3
(b) provides an example that shows how an arbitrary system call can be formed by jumping
into the middle of a legal 32-bit instruction. This violates the first restriction stated above.
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Figure 3.3 (c) and (d) show how the uSFI compiler fixes these potential violations. To fix
scenario (a), a NOP instruction is inserted between the two 16-bit instructions. The sce-
nario in (b) is fixed by replacing the 32-bit instruction with an equivalent 16-bit instruction
sequence.
Another avenue to generate illegal instructions is through data embedded in code mem-
ory. This occurs when using PC-relative addressing to access data. In PC-relative addressing,
the data to be loaded is located in the code region at a fixed offset from the program counter.
With data embedded in the executable code region, it is possible to form illegal instructions
by jumping into the code-segment embedded data. The uSFI compiler deals with this poten-
tial vulnerability by excising all data from the code segment. With our baseline compiler
(LLVM), code-segment embedded data is limited to immediate values for register loads. The
compiler deals with potential violations by simply replacing the instructions with other safe
instructions. For example, in the ARMv7-M architecture PC-relative load instructions can
be replaced by two immediate move instructions, as shown in Figure 3.4. The replacement
does not incur any performance overhead as the two move instructions take the same amount
of time to execute as a single load instruction
Algorithm 3.2 Algorithm for uSFI Verifier
1: procedure VERIFYBINARY(Binary)
2: size of binary← sizeof(Binary) . Binary size in bytes
3: IP← 0 . Byte index
4: while IP < (size of binary−2) do
5: Inst16← Binary[IP : IP+2] . 16-bit instruction
6: Inst32← Binary[IP : IP+4] . 32-bit instruction
7: if disallowed instruction(Inst16) then
8: offending IP← IP
9: offending inst← Inst16
10: return false
11: if disallowed instruction(Inst32) then
12: offending IP← IP
13: offending inst← Inst32
14: return false
15: IP← IP+2
16: return true
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Algorithm 3.2 shows the pseudo-code for the uSFI verifier. The algorithm is specific
to the ARMv7-M architecture. The verifier scans through the compiled binary and checks
all possible 16-bit and 32-bit instructions for potential code violations. The check takes
O(2n) time, where n is the number of half-words (16 bits) within the code. Once a binary
is verified, it is signed to prevent potential tampering. We assume a bootloader verifies the
binary signature on system startup.
3.3.4 uSFI Runtime
The second component of uSFI, the uSFI runtime, manages modules at runtime. The re-
sponsibilities of the runtime include handling the switch between modules and handling
interrupts/exceptions. The runtime keeps a list of modules and their configurations. The
configurations include the value of the stack pointer for the module, MPU configurations,
and privilege levels of the module. The runtime also keeps a list of exported functions and
their entry points for each module. These are functions that can be called from within other
modules.
Inter-module Function Calls One of the tasks of the uSFI-runtime is to handle the switch
between modules. A switch between modules is required when a module wants to call an
exported function in another module. At compilation, the uSFI compiler installs gateway
functions in each module to facilitate module switches. The gateway function is an entry
point to a module. Modules interact with the runtime through supervisor calls. A supervisor
call takes an argument that indicates what the caller is requesting. When a module is created
it is assigned a module number. During cross-module function calls, the module number is
used as an argument to a supervisor call to indicate the callee’s module.
Figure 3.5 shows the steps involved in inter-module function calls. In the figure function
foo A in module A wants to call the exported function bar B in module B. In (1) Module A
passes a pointer to function bar B in register rx. Then it issues a supervisor call, with module
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foo_A:
…
rx = &bar_B
SVC Module_B
…
Module A
Mod_B_gateway:
CALL *rx:
SVC EXIT
bar_B:
…
Return 
…
SVC_Handler:
check = Address_Check (rx)
if (check == PASS):
Save return address
Save MPU configuration
Reconfigure MPU
Switch stack
JMP Mod_B_gateway
else:
CALL error_handler
Module B
uSFI Runtime
SVC_Handler:
Restore return address
Restore MPU configuration
Switch stack
Return 
uSFI Runtime
1
2
34
Figure 3.5 Inter-module Function Call. The figure shows the steps involved in calling functions
across modules. In the figure, module A wants to call the function bar B in module B. In (1) Module
A issues a supervisor call with SVC number of module B as an input to the uSFI runtime after
passing a pointer to function bar B in register rx. The uSFI runtime verifies the function pointer. If
the check passes, the runtime saves the return address and the MPU configurations of module A and
changes the MPU configuration to enable memory regions of module B. Then the runtime switches
the stack and jumps to the gateway function in module B (2). At the end of execution of function
bar B, module B issues an exit supervisor call to the uSFI runtime (3). The uSFI runtime restores the
stack and MPU configurations of Module A and transfers control back to module A (4).
number of module B as an argument, to the uSFI runtime. (Note that from a programmer’s
perspective this is a regular function call; the supervisor call instruction and the assignment
to register rx are automatically inserted by the uSFI compiler). The uSFI runtime verifies
that the function pointer points to a function exported by module B. If the check passes,
the runtime saves the return address and the MPU configurations of module A. Then, after
changing the MPU configuration to enable memory regions of module B and switching the
stack, control is transferred to the gateway function in module B (2). At the end of execution
of function bar B, module B issues an exit supervisor call to the uSFI runtime (3). Finally,
the uSFI runtime restores the stack and MPU configurations of module A and transfers
control back to module A (4).
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Module A
Interrupt_Handler:
.
.
.
SVC EXIT
Interrupt_Service_Routine:
Save return address
JMP Interrupt_Handler
Module A
uSFI Runtime
SVC_Handler:
Restore return address
Return 
uSFI Runtime
1 2
34
.
.
.
Figure 3.6 uSFI Interrupt Handling. The figure shows the interrupt handling process in a uSFI-
enabled system. When an interrupt occurs, control is transfered to the interrupt service routine in
the uSFI runtime. The runtime saves the return address for the interrupt and invokes an interrupt
handler routine assigned by a module. Normally interrupt service routines run in privileged mode.
Therefore, the runtime changes the privilege level before the module routine is invoked. Once the
module interrupt handler finishes execution, it issues a supervisor call to the runtime, which then
transfers control back to the module instruction where the interrupt occurred.
Interrupt/Exception Handling Interrupt handling is performed by the uSFI runtime. The
uSFI API allows modules to assign their own interrupt handler routines to certain events.
Figure 3.6 shows the interrupt handling process in a uSFI-enabled system. In the figure, an
interrupt occurs while module A is executing. As a result, control is transfered to an interrupt
service routine in the uSFI runtime. This routine sets the right privileges, saves the return
address and calls an interrupt handler routine assigned by the module. All module interrupt
service routines end with a supervisor call instruction. At the end of a module interrupt
service routine, an exit supervisor call is issued to the uSFI runtime. In the supervisor call
handler, the uSFI runtime restores the return address to module A and transfers control back
to module A.
50
3.4 uSFI Implementation
In this section we discuss our implementation of the uSFI architecture. We implemented
uSFI for the ARM Cortex-M based microcontrollers that use the ARMv7-M architecture.
The ARMv7-M architecture is a widely used architecture in embedded processors. Al-
though the discussion in this section is specific to ARMv7-M architecture, it also applies to
ARMv7-R and the new ARMv8-M/R architectures.
3.4.1 MPU Configuration
For our implementation, we used Cortex-M4 based microcontrollers, although the tech-
niques described here work for all ARM Cortex-M and Cortex-R processors. The MPUs in
these microcontrollers allow configuring up to eight memory regions (region 0 to region
7). Region 0 to region 5 are used for code, read-only data, stack, private data (bss, data and
heap), and public data, respectively. The remaining three regions are used for peripheral
access control. Note that we don’t need to explicitly configure any region for the uSFI
runtime or inactive modules since any region not included in the configuration is treated as a
background region and can only be accessed by privileged code (i.e., uSFI runtime).
Embedded devices typically include multiple peripherals. uSFI provides fine-grained
peripheral access control by granting modules access to only the peripherals they need.
Peripherals in microcontrollers are typically memory-mapped, therefore peripheral access
can be controlled by using the MPU. In microcontrollers with eight MPU regions, three of
the regions are used to provide peripheral access control. In this case, the peripheral memory
region is divided into three regions. Cortex-M4 MPUs allow further subdividing of each
region into eight equal-sized sub-regions. This approach allows up to 24 distinct peripheral
regions that can be enabled or disabled to provide fine-grained peripheral access control.
Two MPU registers need to be configured for each module region. These are the MPU
Region Base Address Register (MPU RBAR) and the MPU Region Attribute and Size Reg-
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Figure 3.7 uSFI Compiler Implementation. The uSFI compiler is implemented as an LLVM pass
and an assembly rewriter. The LLVM pass assigns code and data sections to modules based on
configurations provided by a programmer. In addition to this, the pass installs gateway functions in
each module to facilitate cross-module function calls. The assembly rewriter converts cross-module
function call instructions to supervisor call instructions, and makes sure the restrictions listed in
Section 3.3 are satisfied by rewriting potentially illegal instructions and removing embedded data in
code sections.
ister (MPU RASR). MPU RBAR defines a region’s start address. MPU RASR defines a
region’s size and memory attributes, and enables the region and its sub-regions. MPU
register configurations for module stack and peripheral regions are obtained at compile time.
Start address and sizes of code and data regions are not known until link time, and therefore
MPU register configurations for module code and data regions are resolved at link time.
3.4.2 uSFI Compiler and Verifier
The uSFI compiler is implemented as an LLVM [50] compiler pass and an assembly rewriter.
Figure 3.7 shows the compilation process. The LLVM pass identifies module functions and
assigns them code sections in such a way that all functions of a module belong to the same
code section. This ensures that a module’s code occupies contiguous code memory. Module
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data (read-only, initialized and uninitialized data) is also assigned sections in data memory.
In addition to assigning sections, the LLVM pass also installs a gateway function in each
module as shown in Figure 3.5.
Assembly rewriting is used to replace calls to exported functions with supervisor call
(SVC) instructions that invoke the uSFI runtime. Register r4 is used to pass a pointer to the
exported function as shown in Figure 3.5. Assembly rewriting is also used to replace all
module load and store instructions with unprivileged load and store instructions. Finally,
the modified assembly is linked using the gcc linker (ld) with a linker script describing
how code and data sections are positioned in physical memory. Module code and data are
assigned contiguous regions in memory. uSFI runtime code and data is placed at a fixed,
known address in physical memory. The start addresses and sizes of each regions, which are
used by the uSFI runtime to configure the MPU, are obtained from the linker.
We implemented a verifier using the radare2 reverse-engineering framework [70]. We
tested the verifier on unmodified binaries (compiled with the gcc compiler) from the
MiBench benchmark suite [71], and unsurprisingly there were illegal supervisor call in-
structions. These instructions were found embedded in the code-segment data as shown in
Figure 3.3. We found such illegal instructions in four of the benchmarks (qsort, basicmath,
rijndael and mbedtls). Embedded data was removed and PC-relative load instructions were
replaced by immediate move instructions to ensure that these illegal sequences could not be
invoked.
3.4.3 uSFI Runtime
The uSFI runtime is a small code written in C and assembly with the bulk of the code
implementing a supervisor call (SVC) handler. It has a total size of less than 150 lines of C
and assembly statements. The runtime keeps a list of module MPU register configurations
and exported functions with their entry points for each module. It also has a stack that it
uses to save and restore MPU register configurations on module switches. The runtime code
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and data memory can not be accessed by any module. Furthermore, the MPU configuration
registers, and the Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC) can only be accessed by
the uSFI runtime. This restriction is achieved by making the uSFI runtime code the only
privileged software component in the system.
Modules can call exported functions in other modules. During cross-module function
calls, function arguments are passed through registers, and when necessary, through the
stack. ARM uses registers r0 to r3 to pass function arguments; therefore for most cases
passing arguments through registers is sufficient. In the rare case of more than four function
arguments, the stack is used to pass the additional arguments. In this case, uSFI copies the
additional arguments to the stack of the callee’s module. In addition to this, uSFI clears
registers during module switches to prevent data leaks. Each module includes a public data
region that is accessible by all modules. This region is used to pass larger data to other
modules.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated uSFI using representative embedded benchmarks. We used two develop-
ment boards for our evaluations: STMicroelectronics’s NUCLEO-F446RE development
board [72], and NXP’s FRDM-K64F development board [73]. The NUCLEO-F446RE
board uses a microcontroller with an ARM Cortex-M4 processor, 512KB flash memory, and
128KB RAM. The FRDM-K64F board uses a microcontroller with an ARM Cortex-M4
processor, 1MB flash memory, and 256KB RAM. During our evaluation, we evaluated code
size and performance overheads of uSFI, as well as the trusted code size for the original
runtime and a hardened version with many additional runtime checks.
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3.5.1 Code Size Overhead
We evaluated the overhead in module code size using benchmarks from the MiBench embed-
ded benchmark suite [71], mbed TLS library [74] and the FreeRTOS kernel [75], a widely
used embedded RTOS. There are two sources of code size overhead in uSFI. First, there is
minor overhead when replacing PC-relative load and arithmetic operations in module code.
PC-relative loads (16-bit instructions) are replaced with two immediate move instructions
(32-bit each) as shown in Figure 3.4. 32-bit immediate arithmetic operations are replaced
with immediate move instructions followed by register arithmetic operations. The other
source of code size overhead is when replacing ”ordinary” load and store instructions with
unprivileged load and store instructions in restricted-privileged modules.”Ordinary” memory
access instructions are typically 16-bit instructions in the ARMv7-M architecture, while
unprivileged memory access instructions are 32-bit instructions.
Table 3.3 shows the code size overhead for benchmarks from MiBench, mbed TLS
library, and the FreeRTOS kernel. The mbedtls benchmark tests all the cryptographic oper-
ations in the mbed TLS library. Except for FreeRTOS, all benchmarks are running as an
unprivileged module (i.e., the benchmarks use ”ordinary” load and store instructions). The
FreeRTOS kernel is used to evaluate the code size overhead of using unprivileged load and
store instructions. Normally the kernel runs in privileged level, and therefore it has access
to the entire system memory. But in a uSFI-enabled system, it runs in restricted-privileged
level (i.e., it doesn’t have access to task memory). The last row in Table 3.3 shows the code
size overhead of sandboxing the FreeRTOS kernel.
In the table rijndael has a relatively higher code size overhead among the unprivileged
benchmarks. This is due to the large number of PC-relative loads of the same pointers to
s-box tables. FreeRTOS has a relatively larger code size overhead since unprivileged load
and store instructions are twice as large as the ordinary memory access instructions. Overall,
compared to the total size of the flash memory in the devices, the additional code size is
small.
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Table 3.3 Code Size Overhead. The table shows the code size overhead of replacing PC-relative
load and arithmetic operations to remove data embedded in code memory. Here each benchmark
except FreeRTOS is assumed to be running as an unprivileged module. FreeRTOS is running as a
restricted-privileged module, i.e., in addition to not having access to PC-relative load and arithmetic
operations, it uses unprivileged memory access instructions.
Benchmark
Original
Code Size
(Bytes)
Additional
Code Size
(Bytes)
% Overhead
dijkstra 11388 576 5.1
susan 51092 406 0.8
basicmath 22880 806 3.5
bitcount 9248 280 3.0
qsort 18572 744 4.0
stringsearch 17484 130 0.7
rijndael 41904 3224 7.7
sha 8676 232 2.7
blowfish 16512 560 3.4
FFT 18008 410 2.3
CRC32 7388 228 3.1
mbedtls 362736 2682 0.7
FreeRTOS 45360 4272 9.6
The results shown in Table 3.3 are obtained by naively removing all embedded data
from code memory. Although the overhead is small, it can be further reduced to a negligible
size by selectively removing embedded data, i.e., remove only data that can potentially be
used to form illegal instructions as discussed in Section 3.3. Finally, it is important to note
that there is no performance overhead inside the sandboxes, since instructions (in particular
loads/stores and indirect jumps) are not instrumented in any fashion.
3.5.2 Performance Overhead
We also measured performance overhead of uSFI using other highly detailed real-world
applications. To measure execution cycles, we used the Data Watchpoint and Trace Unit
(DWT) facility available on ARM Cortex-M4 processors [76]. DWT provides clock cycle
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Figure 3.8 ARM Wearable Reference Design Step Analysis Application. The figure shows a block
diagram and flow chart of a step analysis application used to evaluate performance overhead of uSFI.
The application periodically samples sensor data, calculates walking and running steps and displays
the result on a display. In (a) the different modules of the application are shown. The Minar Event
Scheduler is a scheduler in ARM’s mbedOS. Myotest Library Feeder and Myotest Library are step
analysis libraries from Myotest. The UI Framework is a user interface library.
measurements among other things.
The performance overhead in uSFI comes from module switches during cross-module
function calls as shown in Figure 3.5. Overall, it takes 210 cycles to call a function in a
different module and 150 cycles to return from the call. To evaluate the effect of module
switching on applications’ overall performance, we used two applications: a step analysis
test application from ARM’s Wearable Reference Design (WRD) [77] and an HTTPS file
Download application [78].
3.5.3 Case Study 1: Step Analysis
The step analysis application periodically samples sensor data from accelerometer and
gyroscope sensors, and calculates walking and running steps. The result is displayed on a
matrix LCD. Figure 3.8 shows a block diagram of the application. The application has three
major components. The minar event scheduler is a non-preemptive event scheduler from
mbedOS 3. The myotest library along with myotest library feeder is a step analysis library
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Figure 3.9 Software Modules for HTTPS File Download Application. The figure shows the various
software components of the second test case application. Here each component is running in its
individual sandbox.
from Myotest [79]. The UI framework provides an interface to the matrix LCD display.
We evaluated the application using the NUCLEO-F446RE development board operating at
120MHz. As a sensor input we used a dataset of 14,255 samples of sensor data provided by
Myotest. The output from the application is captured through one of the UART ports on the
board.
Sandboxing can be applied at different levels for different components of an application.
We measured the performance overhead of sandboxing for two cases. In the first case only
the myotest library (with the feeder) was sandboxed. In the second case two sandboxes were
used; one for the myotest library, and another for the UI framework. Table 3.4 shows the
results for the two cases. The table compares the two results with a baseline implementation
where no application components are sandboxed. As can be observed from the table, the
overhead of sandboxing the modules is small. This can be attributed to the low sampling
rate of the sensors (sampling is done every 10ms) as compared to the processing speed of
the processor. This is typical in many embedded systems applications that utilize sensors.
3.5.4 Case Study 2: HTTPS File Download
The second application we tested is an example application for the mbed TLS library. The
application downloads a file from an HTTPS server and looks for a specific string in that file.
The application runs on ARM’s mbedOS embedded operating system. Figure 3.9 shows the
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Table 3.4 Execution Cycles for the Step Analysis Application. The table shows execution cycles
for the step analysis application for three cases. In the baseline application all components of the
application execute in the same security domain. In uSFI 1 only the Myotest library is sandboxed,
while in the case of uSFI 2 both the Myotest library and the UI framework are sandboxed.
Baseline uSFI 1 uSFI 2
Total Number of
Module Switches
0 42765 43778
Additional Clock
Cycles
0 15395400 15760080
Total Clock Cycles 1434843597 1448689953 1449054633
% Overhead 0 1.07 1.10
different software components of the application. Each software component is contained in
its own sandbox. We used the NUCLEO-F446RE development board operating at 120MHz
for the test.
The baseline application (without uSFI) takes on average 3.2 seconds to execute. With
uSFI enabled, an average of 3276 module switches were recorded. Each module switch
takes 3us at 120MHz clock frequency. This results in an average overhead of only 0.31%
overhead. Most of the overhead comes from the Ethernet driver which is invoked every 1ms.
3.5.5 Trusted Code Size
We also measured the code size of the trusted uSFI runtime. The runtime has a code size of
only 1.2kB, resulting in a very small attack surface. To make the runtime even more resilient
to potential attacks, we then hardened it by manually inserting bounds checking instructions
before critical operations. The code size grew to only 1.4kB.
To see the effect of the hardened runtime on the performance of applications, we run
the step analysis application with the hardened runtime. The maximum runtime overhead
increased only very slightly to a modest 1.3%.
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3.6 Related Work
In this section we review previous works, focusing on embedded systems security, particu-
larly code and data isolation.
3.6.1 Software-based Fault Isolation
Wahbe et al. [80] introduced software-based fault isolation as a more efficient way of
providing isolation between tightly-coupled software modules within the same address
space. This is a cheaper alternative to placing modules in separate address spaces and using
Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) to call into each other. To lock down modules within their
fault domains, SFI inserts address checking instructions before every unsafe instruction.
Since then several works have proposed using variants of SFI for different applications
and platforms [81, 82, 83]. Native Client (NaCl) [81] uses SFI to allow running native
C/C++ code within a web browser. NaCl sets constraints on untrusted binaries and uses a
validator to make sure these constraints are met. A follow-up work [82] extends support of
NaCl to x86-64 and ARM platforms. XFI [83] combines SFI and Control-Flow Integrity
(CFI) techniques to protect host environments (e.g., kernel, web browser) from corruption
by modules that operate within the same address space as the host environment. Example
modules include drivers and DLLs.
ARMlock [84] proposes efficient fault isolation for the ARM architecture by using
memory domain support available on ARM mobile processors. In a similar fashion, our
work uses hardware support to reduce the performance overhead of sandboxing. However,
unlike uSFI, ARMlock targets mobile processors and assumes the kernel is trusted.
3.6.2 Sandboxing in Embedded Devices
Several works have proposed hardware and software techniques to provide isolation in
embedded devices. TrustLite [32] and Tytan [85] propose a hardware extension, Execution-
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Aware Memory Protection Unit (EA-MPU), to provide isolation of trusted modules from
untrusted code including untrusted OS. Similarly uSFI assumes the OS kernel is untrusted,
but doesn’t require any hardware changes. Furthermore, Trustlite uses static hardware con-
figuration table to configure the EA-MPU , which means the area overhead grows quickly
with the number protected modules. This limits the number of protected modules that can
be supported. By allowing a small trusted runtime to configure the MPU, uSFI can support
unlimited number of software modules.
Other line of research has looked at software-only solutions to isolate software modules.
ARMor [33] uses SFI to sandbox non-critical code. It uses binary rewriting to put checks
before store operations identified as being potentially unsafe. At runtime, It uses a separate
control stack to protect return addresses. Similarly, [34] and [35] use a separate stack to
protect return addresses. Other indirect control flow instructions are validated by runtime
checks. To reduce the overhead of the runtime checks, these techniques only provide write
protection. In addition to this, the added memory guard instructions result in large code size
and performance overhead. uSFI provides both memory read and write protections with
negligible inner sandbox performance overhead.
ARM mbed uVisor [86] is a software hypervisor that creates independent secure domains
called boxes. Like uSFI, uVisor uses the MPU to provide isolation and access control to
peripherals. However, there are some important differences between uSFI and uVisor. First,
in uVisor MPU configurations are tied to process switches, i.e., MPU configuration changes
are done at process context switches. This makes isolation between tightly-coupled software
modules expensive. The only way to provide isolation between tightly-coupled components
with uVisor is to put the two components in separate boxes, and use synchronous remote
procedure calls (RPCs) to call into each other’s boxes. But RPCs require process switches,
which means that many cycles are wasted while waiting for the switch. This makes uVisor
unsuitable to provide isolation between tightly-coupled software modules. On the other hand,
in a multi-process system with uSFI, module switches and process switches are separate,
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allowing inter-module calls to be serviced immediately.
Another important difference between uSFI and uVisor is that an RTOS integrated with
uVisor runs with the same privilege as uVisor. That means the RTOS has access to MPU
configuration registers and process memory. On the other hand, in a uSFI-enabled system
only the uSFI runtime has access to MPU configuration registers. Privileged code such as
an RTOS is sandboxed using non-privileged memory access instructions.
Another protection recently added to embedded devices is ARM TrustZone [87]. Trust-
Zone allows partitioning software into secure and normal worlds and provides isolation
between the two. Software in the secure world can access memories in both secure and
normal worlds, while normal software can only access normal world (non-secure) memo-
ries. TrustZone provides new instructions that facilitate switching between the secure and
non-secure states.
While both uSFI and ARM TrustZone provide software isolation, there is an impor-
tant difference between the two. TrustZone has only two security domains (secure and
non-secure), and therefore it can not provide fine-grained isolation between tightly-coupled
modules. On the other hand, uSFI allows as many security domains as are needed. In
addition to this, the TrustZone feature is available on the upcoming devices that support the
ARMv8-M architecture, while uSFI can also be deployed on older devices as long as they
have memory protection units (e.g., devices with ARMv7-M and ARMv7-R architecture).
Some recent works have proposed other mechanisms that enhance the security of em-
bedded devices. Clements et al. [88] proposes privilege overlays to limit the time that a
bare metal program executes at the privileged level to only operations that require privileged
level. It uses a compiler and manual annotation to identify operations that require privileged
level and insert supervisor call instructions to elevate privilege. The work also proposes a
modified safe stack to defend against control-flow hijacking attacks. nesCheck [89] uses
whole-program static analysis and dynamic checking instrumentation to provide memory
safety for programs written in nesC, a dialect of the C language optimized for resource
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constrained embedded devices. C-FLAT [90] provides remote attestation of an embedded
system application’s control-flow path using TrustZone as a trust anchor. Sancus [91]
proposes a hardware extension to provide remote attestation of code running on embedded
platforms that allow mutually distrusting parties to run their software modules on the same
node. In Sancus only the hardware is trusted.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we presented uSFI, a low-cost code and data isolation mechanism for resource
constrained embedded devices. uSFI uses the memory protection unit (MPU) hardware
available in many embedded devices along with static software analysis to provide stronger
security guarantees at a lower cost than previous work. In a uSFI-enabled system, an
application is composed of sandboxed modules. Modules, including privileged modules
(e.g., RTOS kernel), are untrusted. Only a static binary verifier and a small runtime are
trusted. uSFI doesn’t require any hardware changes and incurs only 10% code size overhead
and roughly a 1% performance overhead on representative applications.
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Chapter 4
Detecting Rowhammer Attacks with
Hardware Performance Counters
4.1 Introduction
Errors in DRAM devices have been studied for many years. A significant number of studies
have revealed reliability issues in DRAM devices ranging from transient errors due to cosmic
rays and alpha particles, to permanent errors caused by manufacturing defects and device
wear-out [92, 93, 94, 95]. Though researchers have shown the potential security implications
of these types of errors [96, 97], the unpredictability and low frequency of occurrences of
these errors have made their exploitations less practical.
Recent studies, however, have revealed that disturbance errors in DDR3 and DDR4
DRAM devices pose a major threat for system security [36, 37, 41]. One form of disturbance
errors called rowhammering allows the manipulation of data in a DRAM row by repeatedly
accessing (or “hammering”) adjacent rows. Errors caused by rowhammering are highly
reproducible, making them an ideal target for exploitations.
Recent work by Google’s Project Zero [37] has shown how to leverage rowhammer-
induced bit-flips as the basis for security exploits that include malicious code injection and
memory privilege escalation. Being an important security concern, industry has attempted to
defend against rowhammer attacks. Deployed defenses employ two strategies: (1) doubling
the system DRAM refresh rate and (2) restricting access to the CLFLUSH instruction that
attackers use to bypass the cache to increase memory access frequency (i.e., the rate of
64
rowhammering).
In this chapter we demonstrate that such defenses are inadequate; We show a rowhammer
attack that does not require the CLFLUSH instruction. This attack bypasses the cache by
manipulating cache replacement state to allow frequent misses out of the last-level cache to
DRAM rows of our choosing. We also show from our experiments that, using the CLFLUSH
instruction, it is possible to generate bit flips even if the DRAM refresh rate is increased to
4x.
To protect existing systems from more advanced rowhammer attacks, we develop a
software-based defense, ANVIL, which successfully thwarts rowhammer attacks on existing
systems. ANVIL detects rowhammer attacks by tracking the locality of DRAM accesses
using existing hardware performance counters. Our detector identifies the rows being fre-
quently accessed (i.e., the aggressors), then selectively refreshes the nearby victim rows by
reading from them to prevent bit flips. Experiments on the SPEC2006 benchmarks show that
ANVIL has less than a 1% false positive rate and an average slowdown of 1%. ANVIL is
low-cost and robust, and our experiments make a strong case that it is an effective approach
for protecting existing and future systems from even advanced rowhammer attacks.
4.2 Breaking Current Mitigation Techniques
Multiple techniques have been proposed to protect existing systems from DRAM disturbance
errors. Currently deployed mitigation techniques include doubling the DRAM refresh rate
and disallowing cache flush instruction. In this section we show that these techniques are
insufficient to guarantee protection from rowhammer exploits. First we show that a refresh
period of 32ms is sufficient time to implement a rowhammer attack. Then we show that it is
possible to implement a rowhammer attack without using the CLFLUSH instruction.
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Hammer Minimum Number Time to
Technique of DRAM Row firstAccesses bit flip
Single-Sided
400K 58 ms
with CLFLUSH
Double-Sided
220K 15 ms
with CLFLUSH
Double-Sided
220K 45 ms
without CLFLUSH
Table 4.1 Rowhammer Attack Characteristics: The measured performance of three rowhammer
techniques, i.e., single and double-sided hammering and with/without CLFLUSH to flush the cache.
The experiments are run on a Ubuntu-based Sandy Bridge laptop and a 4GB DDR3 DRAM module.
The table gives the total number of DRAM row accesses each attack variant is able to produce in
64ms and the time until the first bit-flip.
4.2.1 Rowhammering under a Double Refresh Rate
After DRAM disturbance errors and their security implications were widely recognized, a
number of vendors published BIOS updates that double the rate at which DRAM cells are
refreshed [39, 40]. By refreshing the DRAM cells more frequently, it is believed that there is
insufficient time to carry out a rowhammer attack. We perform experiments on a commodity
platform that show that this belief is indeed false. Even when refresh intervals are reduced
to 32ms, it is still possible for a malicious program to cause bit flips by repeatedly accessing
two rows adjacent to a victim row using a hammering technique dubbed double-sided
rowhammering [37]. Table 4.1 lists our experimental results for three rowhammer attacks.
We perform experiments on a system with an Intel core i5-2540M processor (Sandy Bridge)
and a 4GB DDR3 DRAM module while running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. As shown in the results
of Table 4.1, it is possible to employ double-sided row hammering using the CLFLUSH
instruction to flip bits in only 15ms on our DDR3 module—well below the 32ms window of
deployed defenses.
Sequence (a) in Figure 4.1 shows the access sequence used to implement our double-
sided rowhammer attack using CLFLUSH instructions. The attack involves three rows:
Rows 0 and 2 are the aggressor rows, and Row 1 is the victim row. The aggressor rows are
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repeatedly activated to increase the discharge rate in the victim row. The attack works by
first accessing an address in Row 0 (i.e., A0(row0)); Then an address in Row 2 (A1(row2)) is
accessed. After each access, a CLFLUSH instruction is used to flush all levels of cache
thereby ensuring the next access goes directly to the DRAM. This sequence is repeated N
number of times; for our experiments the minimum value of N was equal to 110k to see a
bit flip.
Given the results of our experiment, one might suggest further increases in refresh rate.
The problem with this approach, in general, is that increasing the refresh rate comes at the
cost of increased power and reduced DRAM throughput—as refresh commands compete
with software-requested memory accesses. Going from a 64ms refresh period to the 15ms
required to protect our DRAM—others may be more sensitive to hammering—requires over
a 4x increase in refresh power and throughput overhead. Also, as DRAM continues to move
to smaller feature sizes, the vendors will have to lower the refresh rate more to account for
increased density (i.e., future DRAM will likely be more susceptible to rowhammering at
the cell level).
4.2.2 Rowhammering without the CLFLUSH instruction
Modern processors include multiple levels of cache for faster access of frequently used
data. It is common to have three or more levels of cache with the last-level cache capable of
storing megabytes of data. In order to repetitively open and close a DRAM row, memory
access to that DRAM row must miss on all cache levels and the DRAM row buffer. One way
to achieve this is to use cache flushing instructions like CLFLUSH on the x86 architecture.
Previous works on exploiting the rowhammer problem all used the CLFLUSH instruction to
bypass caches. One counter measure that has been taken to thwart CLFLUSH based attacks
is to disallow the CLFLUSH instruction [37]. Such measures thwart rowhammmer attacks
based on cache flushing, but we show that it is possible to implement a rowhammer attack
without using cache flush instructions.
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Figure 4.1 Memory Access Patterns for CLFLUSH-based & CLFLUSH-free Double-sided
Rowhammer Attacks: In (a), a CLFLUSH instruction is used to flush caches after accessing ag-
gressor DRAM rows Row 0 and Row 2. This sequence of operations is repeated N times. In our
experiments the minimum value of N observed was 110K. In (b) the CLFLUSH instructions are
replaced with sequences of memory accesses that force misses in the L3 cache at addresses that map
to aggressor Row 0 and aggressor Row 2. This is done by accessing conflicting data that belong to
the same cache set as the aggressor row addresses. A0: address in aggressor row 1 and maps to set
X; A1: address in aggressor row 2 and maps to set Y; X1, X2, ... X12: addresses that map to cache
set X and evict A0;Y1, Y2, ... Y12: addresses that map to cache set Y and evict A1.
Rowhammering in the presence of caches: One way to force a miss from a cache with-
out using the CLFLUSH instruction, is to evict previously accessed data by accessing
conflicting data that belongs to the same cache set. To accomplish this, an eviction set that
contains addresses that belong to the same cache set is created. Then the addresses are
accessed one after the other to force eviction of a particular data element from the cache.
If the access sequence is cleverly designed to manipulate the cache eviction policy, it is
possible to precisely control which addresses hit in the cache and which addresses miss
the cache and make it to main memory. This minimizes the delay between subsequent
target misses. By repetitively evicting data from a target address and then re-accessing it,
corresponding DRAM rows can be activated. Nonetheless, there are significant challenges in
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devising efficient address reference streams that can implement a rowhammer attack. First,
last-level caches in modern processors have high associativity, usually 8-way to 16-way.
Because each way can hold the address of the aggressor row, we must generate at least as
many conflicting memory accesses as there are ways. Therefore, many memory accesses
are required to evict a cache block, which slows down the hammering process. A second
problem is that replacement policies used on real hardware are not true LRU (and vendors
usually do not publicly disclose them). This means that access patterns that assume true
LRU replacement policy do not often result in misses on the required target addresses.
Missing on the exact target addresses is important as creating extraneous memory acceses
dramatically decreases the rate of hammering.
Demonstration of the attack: In this Section we will describe how we were able to
surpass the challenges mentioned above to do CLFLUSH-free rowhammering. For our
demonstration we use a processor with an Intel Sandy Bridge micro-architecture. The
processor has three levels of cache. The last-level cache is an inclusive, shared, physically
indexed 12-way cache. It is an inclusive cache, such that it is enough to evict a word from
the last-level cache to bypass the whole cache hierarchy.
One way to create an eviction set is to directly use physical addresses and select memory
addresses with the same set-index bits. But since Intel does not publicly disclose physical
address to cache set mapping, some reverse engineering is required. Previous work in this
area has revealed the mapping for the Intel Haswell microarchitecture [98]. Seaborn [99]
discovered that the Sandy Bridge micro-architecture used a slightly modified version of this
mapping. In our eviction set we have one address that belongs to a row (which we call an
aggressor address). Since our cache is a 12-way cache, we need 13 addresses in the eviction
set: 12 conflicting addresses and the aggressor address. We create an eviction set by first
picking the aggressor address and then using its physical address to find 12 more addresses
with matching cache set mapping. On our Intel Sandy Bridge machine, bits 6 to 16 of the
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physical addresses are used to map to last-level cache sets. Furthermore, the last-level cache
is organized into slices [100], with one slice per processor core. Conflicting addresses will
have the same cache slice and cache set-index bits.
The next step is to create an efficient memory access pattern that has a high probability
of misses on the aggressor address. Creating such a pattern requires knowing the cache
replacement policy of the micro-architecture. Since this is not publicly disclosed, we had to
reverse engineer the replacement policy. We did this by generating a high miss-rate pattern
that cyclically accesses the 13 addresses, and using performance counters (particularly the
last-level cache miss counter) to determine whether each access was a cache hit or a cache
miss. Then we correlate the performance counter results with results from different cache
replacement policy simulators that we built. Our results show that one of the replacement
algorithms Sandy Bridge favors (it uses more than one) is Bit Pseudo-LRU (Bit-PLRU)
which is similar to the Not Recently Used (NRU) replacement policy [101]. In Bit-PLRU,
each cache line in a set has a single MRU (Most Recently Used) bit. Every time a cache line
is accessed, its MRU bit is set. When the last MRU bit is set, the other MRU bits in the set
are cleared.
A time efficient access pattern misses the last-level cache only on the aggressor address
and one additional conflicting address, and hits on the rest of addresses in the eviction set.
This works by always driving the aggressor address to the least recently used position in the
replacement state. Sequence (b) in Figure 4.1 outlines the access pattern we used for our
CLFLUSH-free double-sided rowhammer attack. This attack is similar to the CLFLUSH-
based attack except here the CLFLUSH instructions are replaced with memory accesses
that drive the two aggressor DRAM row addresses to the least recently used (LRU) position
in the L3 cache and subsequently evict them, thereby ensuring their next access goes to
the aggressor DRAM rows. In Figure 4.1b, address A0(row0,setx) belongs to Row 0 in the
DRAM, and SetX in the L3 cache. Address A1(row2,sety) belongs to Row 2 in the DRAM,
and Sety in the L3 cache. The two addresses constitute the aggressor addresses. First, data
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at address A0(row0,setx) is accessed. Then 10 addresses (X1(setx) to X10(setx)) that belong to
Setx are accessed to put A0(row0,setx) to the LRU position of the L3 cache. Then, when data
from address X11(setx) is accessed, data at Address A0(row0,setx) is evicted from the L3 cache.
The next 9 accesses (X1(setx) to X9(setx)) hit in the L3. Then, after data at address X12(setx)
is accessed, address X11(setx) is put to the LRU position and subsequently replaced by data
at address A0(row0,setx). This access sequence is repeated N times, with only two addresses
(A0(row0,setx) and X11(setx)) missing for each iteration. In sety, a similar access pattern is
used to miss only from addresses A1(row2,sety) and Y 11(sety). Using this technique, accesses
to Row 0 and Row 2 will always access the DRAM.
Access to the last-level cache on Sandy Bridge takes 26 to 31 cycles [100]. Considering
a DRAM access latency of 150 cycles, the access pattern in sequence b) in Figure 4.1 takes
an estimated (29*20) + (2*150) = 880 cycles. On our test machine, which runs at a nominal
frequency of 2.6GHz, this access pattern takes approximately 338 nanoseconds. This allows
up to 190K double-sided hammers with-in a 64ms refresh period. This is enough to produce
a flip on our test DRAM module—which only requires 110k accesses to produce a bit flip.
Table 4.1 compares the minimum number of DRAM row accesses and the corresponding
time required to produce a bit flip for CLFLUSH-based and CLFLUSH-free attacks for our
test DRAM modules. Double-sided, CLFLUSH-based row hammering is the most aggres-
sive of the three. It is also worth noting that a double-sided CLFLUSH-free rowhammering
can produce bit flips faster than single-sided CLFLUSH based hammering.
It is interesting to note that if both of the protection mechanisms detailed in this section
were used in tandem (i.e., double refresh plus restricted access to CLFLUSH), such a system
would still today have a measure of protection against rowhammer attacks, including those
detailed in this chapter. As shown in Table 4.1, we are unable to yet rowhammer memory
in less than 32ms without use of the CLFLUSH instruction. While we are unaware of any
systems that combine these two protection measures, one that did would likely only acquire a
temporary measure of protection against novel rowhammer attacks. We continue to optimize
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the performance of our CLFLUSH-free attack, and if we are able to reduce its time-to-first
bit flip by an additional 13ms, the combined protections will no longer work. Recognizing
the tenuous nature of today’s rowhammer protections, we feel a better approach to protect
systems is to provide in situ mechanisms that detect and subsequently defeat rowhammer
attacks.
In summary, current techniques used to protect systems from rowhammer attacks are
insufficient. We show that reducing DRAM refresh period to 32ms is not sufficient as
faster rowhammer attacks are possible using double-sided rowhammering in as little at
15ms. Moreover, by manipulating the LRU chain of the last-level cache, enough DRAM
row activations can be performed in a single refresh cycle to flip bits, without using the
CLFLUSH instruction.
4.3 Software-Based Rowhammer Detection and
Protection
As Section 4.2 shows, currently deployed rowhammer defenses are insufficient. What is
needed is a more robust solution that can detect hammering activity in time to protect any
potential victim rows. In this section, we introduce a software technique that uses existing
hardware performance counters in commercial processors to detect hammering activity and
perform selective refresh on potential victim rows.
4.3.1 Detecting Rowhammer Attacks
Rowhammering relies on repetitively accessing an aggressor DRAM row within a single
refresh cycle. We make the observation that this fundamentally requires accesses to the
aggressor rows to miss on all cache levels. This reveals two identifying characteristics of
rowhammering: high cache miss rate and high temporal locality of DRAM row accesses.
This is in contrast to general memory access patterns where high locality results in high
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cache hit rates. As such, it is straightforward to discriminate between rowhammer attacks
and non-malcious programs by looking at DRAM access patterns and rate.
Another property of rowhammer attacks is high bank locality. DRAM disturbance errors
occur due to repeated opening and closing of a row. When a row is accessed, it is opened
and its data is transferred to a row-buffer. Subsequent accesses to the same row are served
by the row-buffer. In order to close the row, a different row located in the same bank must
be accessed. Therefore, a rowhammer attack involves repeatedly accessing at least two
rows within the same bank—otherwise the row buffer would prevent the hammering. This
bank locality property can be used to differentiate between ”real” row hammering and false
positives that are caused by thrashing access patterns observed in some applications.
To minimize the performance impact of rowhammer detection, we propose a two-stage
detection mechanism. In the first stage, we monitor the last-level cache miss rate. If this rate
is high enough to successfully implement a rowhammer attack, the second stage samples
the physical addresses of the memory accesses that miss from the last-level cache. If the
samples reveal DRAM row accesses with high temporal locality, then the detector signals
this as a potential rowhammer attack. To reduce the possibility of false positives, the detector
also verifies that the samples have bank locality. If there is enough bank locality among
samples, then a protection phase follows.
4.3.2 Protecting Potential Rowhammer Victims
When the detector identifies potential rowhammering activity, it identifies the potential
victim DRAM rows. Victim rows are adjacent to (above and below) identified aggressor
rows. To protect the victim rows we refresh them by reading a word from them. Reading
from a row opens that row which has the effect of refreshing cells in the row [36]. This
approach does not incur significant performance penalties even in the case of false positives.
73
Figure 4.2 Software-Based Rowhammer Attack Detector: ANVIL is a kernel module. It gets
last-level cache miss count and memory access samples from hardware performance counters. By
combining sampled virtual address information and process descriptor structures, samples of DRAM
row accesses are obtained. ANVIL then checks the samples for high locality that suggests potential
rowhammer activity. Upon detection of potential rowhammer activity, ANVIL performs selective
read operations to refresh victim DRAM rows.
4.3.3 ANVIL: A Linux-Based Rowhammer Protection Mechanism
To demonstrate the protection mechanism, we built ANVIL, a Linux kernel module that
prevents all known forms of rowhammer attacks. The module uses hardware performance
counters found in modern processors to get memory access information, such as the ad-
dresses of loads and stores and the miss rate of the last-level cache. Specifically, we
used performance counters found in Intel microprocessors with Sandy Bridge and later
microarchitectures. AMD also provides similar capabilities required for our implementa-
tion [102]. In this section we provide details of our implementation. We start by reviewing
the performance counter features used in our implementation.
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Load Latency Performance Monitoring Facility: The Load Latency performance mon-
itoring facility is part of Intel’s Performance Event Base Sampling (PEBS) feature. PEBS
uses a debug store mechanism and a performance monitoring interrupt to store a set of
architectural states [103]. The load latency facility measures latency of a load operation
from the load’s first dispatch until final data writeback from the memory subsystem. The
load operation is sampled probablistically by hardware. If the latency of the sampled load
operation exceeds a latency value specified by a dedicated programmable register, the
operation is tagged to carry the following information:
• Load data virtual address
• Data source
• Latency value
When the next event categorized as a precise event (e.g. ”load retired”, ”store retired”)
occurs, the last update of the load information is written to a PEBS record which then can
be read by software. By setting the latency threshold to match last level cache miss latency,
it is possible to sample last-level cache misses. The data source information confirms the
source of the load operation.
Precise Store Facility : The Precise Store facility complements the Load Latency facility
by providing additional information about sampled store operations. When a precise event
occurs, hardware samples the virtual address and data source of the next store that retires.
Similar to the Load Latency event, data source information can be used to determine the
store was a miss.The precise store facility is replaced with the Data Address Profiling facility
on Intel’s Haswell and later microarchitectures [103]. This facility profiles load and store
memory events similar to the other facilities, but has support for more events like DRAM
access events. While we could implement ANVIL with either performance counter, we use
the Precise Store facility for our implementation since it allows our rowhammer detection
mechanism to support older micro-architectures.
In addition to the previously mentioned facilities, we utilize the last-level cache miss
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counter to monitor the last-level cache miss rate.
Rowhammer Detection: Figure 4.2 shows the process of detecting a rowhammer activity
in ANVIL. In the first stage of the detection phase, the last-level cache miss count event
(LONGEST LAT CACHE.MISS) is used to measure the last-level cache miss rate. The
miss rate is calculated by reading the last-level cache miss count for a time duration of tc. If
this rate is beyond a last-level cache miss threshold (LLC MISS THRESHOLD), the second
stage of the detector is triggered. The last-level cache miss threshold is set by considering
the minimum cache miss rate that is enough to cause bit-flips within a single refresh period.
As will be described in the next section we set this value based on our empirical observations.
The value can be easily changed to adapt to other systems.
In the second stage, ANVIL samples virtual addresses for a time duration of ts
using Load Latency (MEM TRANS RETIRED.LOAD LATENCY) and Precise Store
(MEM TRANS RETIRED. PRECISE STORE) events. The load latency facility allows
sampling of loads that have latency beyond a preset clock cycle value. We set the clock
cycle value to match last-level cache miss latency so that we only sample loads that miss in
the last-level cache. The counter also provides information about the source of the sample,
therefore we can ensure the load accessed DRAM. The precise store facility is used to
sample stores. It also provides information about the source of a store operation. Which
facility to use for sampling is selected based on a count of retired memory load operations
that missed from the last-level cache (MEM LOAD UOPS MISC RETIRED LLC MISS)
for a time duration of tc. ANVIL compares this value with the total number of last-level
cache misses for that duration. If load operations account for more than 90% of all misses
then only loads are sampled. On the other hand, if load operations account for less than
10% of all misses, only stores are sampled. For the remaining cases, both stores and loads
are sampled. Load and store sampling rates are adjustable. For our experiments, we used
a sampling rate of 5000 samples per second which gives an average of 30 samples for a
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sampling duration of 6ms. The second stage also samples the process descriptor (task struct)
of the process that generated the memory access. This structure is used to determine the
physical address and DRAM row of the memory access in combination with the sampled
virtual address.
At the end of sampling, sampled DRAM row accesses are sorted and the sample distribu-
tion is analyzed to identify high DRAM row locality. DRAM row locality is determined by
considering the number of samples, the number of last-level cache misses for the sampling
duration and the required last-level cache miss rate for a successful rowhammr attack. For
each row that has high DRAM locality, a check is made to see if there are other row access
samples from the same DRAM bank. If the cumulative of samples of the other row accesses
from the same DRAM bank is high enough, then there is a potential rowhammer attack
occurring.
Rowhammer Protection: Once ANVIL detects potential hammering activity, we use the
physical addresses of the identified aggressor rows to determine potential victim rows. The
kernel module was pre-configured using a reverse engineered physical address to DRAM
row and bank mapping scheme. We also make the assumption that sequentially numbered
rows are physically adjacent. Two potential victim rows are considered for each potential
aggressor row: rows that are directly above and below each potential aggressor row (our
approach easily extends to N adjacent rows). ANVIL performs a single read operation
per victim row to refresh its value. The number of selective read operations performed
on a potential victim row is low enough (once every tc + ts in the worst case) that it has
little effect on performance of non-hammering applications, even if they experience a high
incidence of false positive detection. Also, it is not possible for an attacker to use the
selective refresh mechanism to rowhammer DRAM rows adjacent to the potential victim
row since the selective read rate is well below the minimum access rate for a rowhammer
attack. After performing a selective refresh, ANVIL starts the detection process again.
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ANVIL Limitations: Although effective, ANVIL’s detection mechanism has some limi-
tations. The ANVIL detection mechanism wouldn’t be able to detect rowhammer attacks in
some scenarios. For example, since ANVIL relies on CPU performance counters, it wouldn’t
be able to detect attacks that use direct memory access (DMA) [104]. Similarly, trusted
execution environments, such as Intel’s SGX, do not allow observation of program char-
acteristics using performance counters. Attacks that originate from an SGX enclave [105]
would not be detected by ANVIL.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we evaluate accuracy and performance of our software detection mechanism.
All tests are conducted on a system with an Intel Core i5-2540M processor and Ubuntu
14.04 LTS with Linux kernel version 4.0.0.
4.4.1 Benchmark Applications
We use several benchmark programs for our evaluations. To evaluate rowhammer detection
accuracy, we use two rowhammer attacks. The first is a CLFLUSH-based double-sided
rowhammer attack, CLFLUSH hammer, adapted from [106]. The second application is
CLFLUSH-free double-sided rowhammer attack, CLFLUSH-free hammer, used to demon-
strate our CLFLUSH-free attack in Section 2. We also measure the slowdown incurred
on non-malicious programs using SPEC2006 integer benchmarks [107] and analyze our
detection algorithm’s sensitivity to potential future attacks.
4.4.2 Rowhammer Detection Characteristics
We first evaluate ANVIL’s ability to detect rowhammer activity. The evaluation is done
for scenarios where the test machine is heavily and lightly loaded. To emulate heavy load,
we run the rowhammering applications along with memory-intensive applications (mcf,
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LLC MISS THRESHOLD 20K
Miss Count Duration (tc) 6ms
Sampling Duration (ts) 6ms
Table 4.2 Rowhammer Detector Parameters to Evaluate Accuracy of Rowhammer Detection
libquantum and omnetpp running at the same time) from the SPEC2006 integer benchmark
suite. The detector parameters used for our evaluation are given on Table 4.2.
The time values are selected to be low enough so that any rowhammering activity can
be detected with enough time to deploy protection. With this setting, hammering activity
can be detected within 12 milliseconds. The last-level cache miss threshold value was
experimentally found by considering the minimum number of memory accesses required
to cause a DRAM bit flip. In our experiments the minimum number of memory accesses
that caused a flip was 220K for CLFLUSH-based double-sided rowhammering attack. In
order to achieve this many activations within a refresh period of 64ms, a minimum of 20.6K
activations must occur within 6ms. Therefore, we will use 20K misses in 6ms as a threshold
value for the first stage of detection.
Table 4.3 shows the result of rowhammering detection for applications CLFLUSH hammer
and CLFLUSH-free hammer under heavy and light load. For both attacks, the table shows
the average time to detect a rowhammer attack within a 64ms refresh cycle in which rowham-
mering was occurring. The table also lists the average selective refresh rate, which are
refreshes that occur when the rowhammer detector identifies potential DRAM victim rows.
As seen in these results, ANVIL is quite responsive, with response times well within a single
refresh cycle, and with only slight increases in response time due to a heavy loaded system.
In addition the selective refresh rates are low, but sufficient for multiple refreshes within a
single refresh cycle for any detected victim row. The low selective refresh rate ensures that
a clever attacker cannot use the selective refresh to hammer other DRAM rows. Finally, it is
good to note that our detector stopped all rowhammering, resulting in zero bit flips for all of
the attacks.
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Benchmark
Average Time Refreshes Total Bit
to Detect per 64ms Flips
CLFLUSH
12.8 ms 12.35 0
(Heavy Load)
CLFLUSH
12.3 ms 10.3 0
(Light Load)
CLFLUSH-free
35.3 ms 4.53 0
(Heavy Load)
CLFLUSH-free
22.85 ms 5.10 0
(Light Loaded)
Table 4.3 Rowhammer Detection Result for Rowhammering Programs: The table shows the
average time before a rowhammer activity is detected and the rate of selective refreshes performed.
4.4.3 Performance Evaluation
We evaluated the slowdown incurred by ANVIL by analyzing the execution of non-malicious
applications from the SPEC2006 integer benchmark suite. We used the parameters listed
on Table 4.2 for the evaluation. In addition to this experiment, we compare the perfor-
mance overhead of ANVIL with that incurred by doubling DRAM refresh rate. For these
evaluations our baseline is an unprotected system with a refresh period of 64ms.
Figure 4.3 shows relative execution times for ANVIL-protected system relative to our
baseline. The ANVIL-protected system has peak and average overheads of 3.18% and
1.17%, respectively. Most of the performance overhead by ANVIL is attributed to the low
last-level cache miss rate threshold. libquantum, omnetpp, mcf and Xalancbmk crossed the
last-level cache miss threshold 95% to 99% of the time. On the other extreme, h264ref,
gobmk, sjeng and hmmer crossed the threshold less than 10% of the time. This indicates
that sampling of addresses in the second stage of the detection phase contributes to al-
most all of the performance overhead. Clearly, the overheads of continuously running
ANVIL’s rowhammer detection are very low. Low enough to protect existing systems from
rowhammer attacks, and likely low enough to obviate the need for dedicated hardware-based
rowhammer protection mechanisms in future systems.
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Figure 4.3 ANVIL’s Impact on Non-Malicious Programs: The Figure shows execution times
for selected benchmarks on ANVIL-enabled system and a system with doubled DRAM refresh rate.
The values shown are normalized to execution time without ANVIL and at a single refresh period.
Table 4.5 shows the false positive rate for the SPEC2006 integer benchmarks. The
rate is measured as the average number of superfluous selective refreshes per second. The
number of false positives is low enough that selective refresh of rows has negligible effect
on performance.
4.4.4 Comparison with Increased Refresh Rate
As we have shown in Section 2, doubling DRAM refresh rate is not sufficient to prevent
all rowhammering attacks. Equally important is the execution time and power overhead
incurred by the increased refresh rate. Previous studies have shown that increasing refresh
rate reduces parallelism in the memory subsystem, affecting overall system performance
[108, 109]. Figure 4.3 shows performance overhead of doubling DRAM refresh rate as com-
pared with our software protection mechanism. ANVIL’s performance overheads are only
marginally larger (on average) than doubling the refresh rate, while providing a significantly
higher level of protection against rowhammer attacks, as demonstrated in Section 2. As can
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Benchmark Refreshes/sec
astar 0.10
bzip2 1.05
gcc 0.71
gobmk 0.19
h264ref 0.00
hmmer 0.00
libquantum 0.06
mcf 0.01
omnetpp 0.02
perlbench 0.00
sjeng 0.00
Xalancbmk 0.05
Table 4.4 Rate of False Positive Refreshes: The table shows rate of superfluous refreshes for
SPEC2006 integer benchmarks while running under ANVIL.
be observed, memory intensive applications like mcf suffer most from doubling DRAM
refresh rate thus, their performance benefits greatly from the use of ANVIL’s protection.
4.4.5 Robustness to Potential Future Rowhammer Attacks
As the density of DRAM devices increase, DRAM cells become more susceptible to dis-
turbance errors. It is then expected that for future DRAM devices, rowhammer attacks
will be possible with less DRAM row activations. An attacker might take advantage of
this to evade detection by our software protection mechanism by: 1) Activating DRAM
aggressor rows at a high rate such that rowhammer attacks will be faster than they can be
detected by the protection mechanism. 2) Spreading out fewer DRAM row activations over
a refresh period such that the last-level cache miss rate stays below the last-level cache miss
threshold. Our detection mechanism can cope with both situations by adjusting the detector
parameters listed on Table 4.2. To evaluate the effect that more nimble future attacks have
on the performance of non-malicious programs, we consider a future scenario where bit flips
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can occur with 110K DRAM row accesses (i.e., half the number of accesses that produced
flips on our experiments).
Figure 4.4 examines the performance impact on a subset of the SPEC2006 benchmarks
for three cases. The benchmarks are selected to be representatives of the memory access
characteristics of SPEC2006 benchmark suit. ANVIL-baseline is our baseline detector with
parameters as given on Table 4.2. ANVIL-heavy considers the case where the 110K DRAM
row accesses can occur within 7.5ms (i.e., half the time we observed for our experiments).
For this case values of tc and ts are set to 2ms while the value of the last-level cache miss
threshold remains unchanged at 20K. The third case, ANVIL-light, considers a situation
where the 110K DRAM row accesses are spread out across a refresh period of 64ms (i.e.,
half the number of accesses purposely spread out maximally). For this case values of ts and tc
are set to 6ms, and the last-level cache miss threshold is halved to 10K. As seen in Figure 4.4,
ANVIL has room to grow if future rowhammer attacks become more aggressive. Overheads
do grow to detect these more nimble attacks, but only slightly. Increasing the last-level miss
sample period to 2ms has the larger performance impact, which is expected as this is the
first-stage mechanism, whose performance overheads are experienced continuously.
Table 4.5 shows false positive refresh rates due to false positives for ANVIL-light and
ANVIL-heavy. Though both configurations show an increase in false positive rates than
ANVIL-baseline, they do not incur significant overheads.
4.5 Related Work
Previous works have studied exploitation and prevention of the rowhammer vulnerability. In
this section, we detail currently known attacks and possible mitigations.
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Figure 4.4 Sensitivity of Execution Overheads to Potential Future Attacks: The Figure com-
pares normalized execution times for selected benchmarks running on ANVIL-enabled system with
three configurations. ANVIL-Heavy is configured to have the highest sampling rate while ANVIL-Light
has the lowest last-level cache miss threshold.
Benchmark
Refreshes/sec Refreshes/sec
(ANVIL-light) (ANVIL-heavy)
bzip2 1.61 1.09
gcc 7.12 1.88
gobmk 0.28 0.84
libquantum 0.13 0.08
perlbench 0.06 0.00
Table 4.5 Rate of False Positive Refreshes for ANVIL-Heavy and ANVIL-Light: The table
shows false positive rates for selected SPEC2006 integer benchmarks while running under two
ANVIL configurations. ANVIL-Heavy has a relatively small sampling period which reduces the
probability of misses with high address locality on non-malicious applications. On the other hand,
ANVIL-light allows more samples for a longer sampling period thus resulting in a relatively larger
false positive rate.
4.5.1 Rowhammer Vulnerability and Its Exploitation
Even if the rowhammer vulnerability on modern DRAMs has been known by manufacturers
since at least 2012 [36], the first detailed experimental study was published in 2014 by
Yoongu Kim, et. al [36]. Their study shows that bits in a DRAM row (the victim row) can
be flipped by repeatedly accessing adjacent rows in the same bank (the aggressor rows). The
authors used x86’s CLFLUSH instruction to bypass the cache and enable frequent references
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directly to DRAM.
Leveraging the early attack demonstrations, Seaborn and Dullien [37] demonstrated
two security exploits that take advantage of rowhammer-induced bit flips. Their first attack
bypasses Google’s Native Client (NaCl) sandboxing system. NaCl is a software sandbox,
integrated with the Chrome browser, that allows secure execution of untrusted client side
applications and plug-ins. NaCl works by carefully scanning code for illegal code operations
at load time (e.g., system calls or arbitrary indirect jumps), and by funneling all I/O opera-
tions through a security analyzer. The NaCl rowhammer attack works by having a securely
loaded NaCl application hammer its own code segment until an illegal arbitrary code jump
sequence is formed, then the application jumps to the middle of an instruction where illegal
operations can be formed from validated code. Note that the attack is changing code that has
been verified and deemed safe. Since the instructions are modified at the hardware level, the
sandbox will not be aware of any of these changes. The author’s current proof-of-concept
implementation can take advantage of 13% of the possible bit flips within an instruction.
Seaborn and Dullien’s second attack takes advantage of the bit flips to bypass the mem-
ory page protection mechanism of a Linux system running on x86-64 [37]. The attack works
by filling physical memory with page tables for a single process, by repeatedly mmap()’ing
a file into its memory. This repeated file mapping sprays the memory with PTEs that are
used to translate the newly mmap()’ed virtual addresses. By rowhammering the memory
with page tables, there is a non-trivial probability that a PTE will be changed to point to a
physical page containing a page table, thereby giving the application access to its own page
tables. This will give the attacker full R/W permission to a page table entry, which in effect
results in access to all of physical memory.
Even if all of the exploits mentioned above rely on CLFLUSH instruction in x86, the
attack we presented in Section 2 demonstrated how rowhammer attacks can be launched
without the use of any cache line flush instruction. Another CLFLUSH-free rowhammer at-
tack announced in July 2015 showed that it is possible to cause flips from within a JavaScript
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application running in a browser [42]. It is important to note that our CLFLUSH-free attack
was completed in May 2015.
4.5.2 Rowhammer Mitigations
In this section, we detail both software and hardware techniques that have been proposed
and deployed to protect against data corruption and security exploits due to rowhammering.
Protections for Legacy Systems
Software Patches: To date, two open source projects have released patches in response
to the security vulnerabilities explained above. Google’s NaCl sandbox was patched to
disallow the use of CLFLUSH instruction by applications running inside it. The attack
mechanism we presented in Section 2 defeats this protection and enables malicious applica-
tions to effectively hammer rows without using CLFLUSH (or any other explicit cache flush
instructions).
Recently, the Linux kernel was updated to disallow the use of the pagemap interface from
the user space, as a measure to make it more difficult to do double-sided rowhammering
in Linux-based systems. This change prevents malicious applications from analyzing the
physical address space to launch targeted attacks. However, this attack still leaves room for
potential attacks that rely on side-channel information to make inferences about the physical
memory layout. Furthermore, certain attacks such as the NaCl sandbox escape attack can be
implemented by repeatedly picking two random addresses without having any knowledge of
the physical address mapping.
Doubling Refresh Rate: Some vendors published BIOS updates that double DRAM
refresh rates(i.e. halving the refresh interval from 64ms to 32ms) [38, 39, 40]. Doubling
the refresh rate reduces the amount of time an attacker has to mount an attack, since the
discharging of a rowhammer’ed bit must be completed within one refresh cycle. However,
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our empirical studies show that it is still possible to induce bit flips through double-sided
hammering even when the refresh period is as low as 16ms. Further increases in refresh
rates would have significant effects on system performance and energy consumption [36].
Protections for Future Systems
Currently available hardware-based reliability features are not capable of mitigating DRAM
disturbance errors. Error Correcting Codes(ECC) protection, aside from being expensive,
is capable of repairing single-bit flips only. Furthermore, ECC will turn the problem of
bit-flips into denial of service if the system has to deal with machine check exceptions every
time a flip is detected [37].
Due to the inability of current memory controllers and memory modules to deal with
rowhammer attacks, multiple hardware enhancements have been proposed. The possibility
of having an activation counter for each row in a DRAM module has been considered in
literature [46, 36]. However, due to the high overhead of maintaining and updating per-row
counters, other alternatives have been recommended.
Probabilistic row refreshing has been proposed as an alternative to per-row counters
[46, 36]. In this technique, when activation command is sent to a row, a random number
generator is used to decide if adjacent row has to be refreshed. Since requests to rows that
are being hammered will be encountered very frequently, there is a high probability that it
will trigger a refresh.
Project Armor [33] introduces an extra buffer that will cache data from rows with re-
peated activation commands. By servicing requests to hammered rows from the extra buffer,
Armor DRAM prevents rows from being accessed repeatedly.
Processor and memory manufacturers are also deploying products with capabilities to
perform targeted row refreshes. The current LPDDR4 standard and recent DDR4 modules
support targeted refresh of potential victim rows [43, 44]. Intel has published patents on
memory controllers that support targeted row refresh [110]. The memory controllers are
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designed to identify repeated reads to a row. However, the actual physical placement of
rows can differ among different manufacturers. Hence, the controller only transmits the row
that is being repeatedly accessed, and the memory module is responsible for refreshing the
victim rows based on its internal structure.
It is important to note that the mitigation techniques for existing systems (i.e., doubling
refresh rate and removing access to CLFLUSH) are shown to be ineffective in this work.
We are able to implement the rowhammer attack in a 32ms double-rate refresh cycle, and
we can also rowhammer DRAMs without access to the CLFLUSH instruction. While newly
proposed hardware enhancements can protect future systems from rowhammer attacks, a
software solution is still necessary to protect current hardware. As such, in this chapter
we detail a low-cost software-based rowhammer detector that thwarts attacks with little
performance impact. It is our claim that these protections are appropriate both for existing
and future designs.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we systematically analyzed a security vulnerability found in commodity
DRAM chips referred to as rowhammer. Rowhammer attacks use the CLFLUSH instruction
to accomplish hammering by bypassing processor caches and repeatedly accessing memory.
We demonstrated that existing mitigation techniques such as doubling refresh rates
and disallowing CLFLUSH instructions are not sufficient—we showed that it possible to
rowhammer in as little as 15ms. We also showed the first CLFLUSH-free rowhammer attack
that does not require special cache flushing instructions, therefore expands the rowham-
mering attack surface. As an alternative protection mechanism, we designed, implemented
and evaluated ANVIL, the first software-based defense that protects against rowhammer
attacks. Our defense leverages the insight that rowhammer memory access patterns are
fundamentally different from those of normal applications. Compared to prior approaches,
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ANVIL is more effective, has lower cost, is readily deployable and is adaptable due to
its software-based approach. Experiments with a diverse set of benchmarks on a real sys-
tem showed that ANVIL has an average slowdown of 1% and less than 1% false positive
detections, while protecting against all tested rowhammer attacks.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we showed how modern hardware features can be leveraged to provide
novel and efficient system security solutions. In the first part of the dissertation we showed
how we can improve the performance of memory safety techniques using existing hardware
features. Chapter 2 presented an efficient temporal memory safety technique that takes
advantage of pointer authentication feature. Our proposed technique uses the unused bits
of a pointer to store metadata. This reduces the memory required to store metadata while
allowing faster metadata access. Our technique reduces the memory overhead by 90% as
compared to a software-only solution. In Chapter 3, we presented an efficient sandboxing
mechanism for low-end embedded systems. This mechanism uses a widely-available mem-
ory protection unit hardware along with a small runtime to provide efficient sandboxing
mechanism. It doesn’t require any hardware changes and incurs a performance overhead of
a little more than 1%.
In the second part of the dissertation, we presented a novel technique to detect rowham-
mer attacks using existing hardware performance counter features. Our technique doesn’t
require any hardware changes and has an average slowdown of only 1%.
5.1 Future Directions
We expect processors to continue adding new features, presenting opportunities to provide
efficient solutions to problems not addressed in this dissertation. However, there are many
opportunities to expand on the solutions presented on this dissertation. We list a few below.
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Complete memory safety: Currently, PETS (presented in Chapter 2) only detects tem-
poral errors such as use-after-free errors. As discussed in Chapter 1, to provide complete
memory safety, we need to address the problem of spatial memory safety as well. An inter-
esting future work would be extending PETS to provide spatial memory safety as well. In
particular, Low-fat PETS, a version of PETS that uses a low-fat memory allocator, can easily
be extended to support spatial safety without requiring any additional metadata storage.
Spatial safety techniques typically involve checking the bounds of memory accesses. Since
the low-fat memory layout allows implicitly storing the size and base address information
of a buffer, bounds checking can be performed from a pointer value alone [49]. Bounds
checking can be added on top of the current checks done by PETS.
Leveraging CPU features in other temporal safety techniques: PETS is based on the
lock-and-key temporal safety technique. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are
other approaches of providing temporal safety. One approach is the page-permission-based
approach [10, 59]. Oscar [10] assigns new virtual pages for each memory allocation. On
free, the corresponding virtual pages are made inaccessible by changing their permissions.
Dangling pointer accesses are then detected through page faults. Even though this approach
has a lower performance overhead as compared to the lock-and-key technique, applications
that allocate/deallocate memory frequently can experience a high performance overhead.
Part of the overhead comes from the system calls when creating and disabling shadow
pages [10]. These expensive system calls can be avoided by using hardware features such as
Intel’s Protection Keys [103]. These features allow assigning page-permissions to virtual
pages in user mode, obviating the need for system calls.
Addressing other Vulnerabilities/Challenges: Existing hardware features can also be
adopted to address other security challenges not discussed in this dissertation. They can
be used to either improve performance of existing solutions or provide new approaches.
One area of interest is side-channels. Some works have already proposed new ways of
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using existing processor features to defend against timing side-channel attacks [111, 112].
However, there are other types of side-channels not addressed by these solutions, such
as speculative execution [113, 114]. It would be interesting to explore ways of providing
protections against such types of side-channels using existing processor features.
Program anomaly detection is another security technique that can benefit from existing
processor features. Program anomaly detection is a general technique that identifies ab-
normal program behaviours (i.e. behaviours that do not fit into normal program behaviors)
caused by attacks. Anomaly detection typically involves collecting and analyzing program
traces. Collecting program traces can be accelerated by using hardware features such as
Intel PT [115]. In addition to this, there is a growing interest in using microarchitectural
characteristics of programs for anomaly detection [116, 117]. ANVIL, presented in Chap-
ter 4 of this dissertation, is also an example of anomaly detection using microarchitectural
characteristics. Modern hardware performance counters are equipped with features that
provide detailed microarchitectural characteristics of programs. Leveraging these features
to detect other attacks would be an interesting future work.
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